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The social benets derived from analysing crime data need to be weighed against issues relating
to privacy loss. To facilitate such analysis of crime data Burke and Kayem [7] proposed a
framework (MCRF) to enable mobile crime reporting in a developing country. Here crimes
are reported via mobile phones and stored in a database owned by a law enforcement agency.
The expertise required to perform analysis on the crime data is however unlikely to be available
within the law enforcement agency. Burke and Kayem [7] proposed anonymising the data(using
manual input parameters) at the law enforcement agency before sending it to a third party for
analysis. Whilst analysis of the crime data requires expertise, adequate skill to appropriately
anonymise the data is also required. What is lacking in the original MCRF is therefore an
automated scheme for the law enforcement agency to adequately anonymise the data before
sending it to the third party. This should, however, be done whilst maximising information
utility of the anonymised data from the perspective of the third party.
In this thesis we introduce a crime severity scale to facilitate the automation of data anonymisa-
tion within the MCRF. We consider a modied loss metric to capture information loss incurred
during the anonymisation process. This modied loss metric also gives third party users the
exibility to specify attributes of the anonymised data when requesting data from the law en-
forcement agency. We employ a genetic algorithm(GA) approach called "CrimeGenes"(CG) to
optimise utility of the anonymised data based on our modied loss metric whilst adhering to
notions of privacy dened by k-anonymity and l-diversity. Our CG implementation is modular
and can therefore be easily integrated with the original MCRF. We also show how our CG ap-
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This thesis explores avenues of automated data anonymisation for crime databases in a setting
where limitations on human technical expertise, computational capacity and time constraints
impede the use of standard solutions. These limitations are characteristic of a developing
country. Our focus on crime data is well suited to the inherent trade-o that exists between
data utility and privacy when publishing anonymised data. There is a social benet when
existing incidents of crime can be analysed to help reduce future criminal activity. However
this needs to be weighed against the fact that such analysis causes a risk of privacy loss for
individuals aected by those crimes. The specic setting for our implementation is based on
a framework where mobile phones are used for crime reporting in the developing world. This
framework was designed and implemented by Burke and Kayem [7]. The framework captures
the limitations we are faced with in a developing country when looking to publish anonymised
crime data.
Our implementation assumes that users of the crime database are not able to query for specic
records. They are, instead, provided with random samples of the data satisfying k-anonymity
and l-diversity constraints. K-anonymisation as rst introduced by [49] has become a widely
adopted benchmark for data anonymisation. Since k-anonymity is provably NP-hard numerous
heuristic algorithms have instead been developed to date for use in various contexts. In a similar
manner we implement a genetic algorithm (GA) to provide heuristic solutions for crime data
anonymisations that satisfy k-anonymity. We then extend this notion of privacy to l-diversity
which seeks to address some of the limitations of k-anonymity.
Users of mobile applications have increased signicantly in recent years, driven largely by
advances in mobile computing power and networking technologies. Software applications previ-
ously considered irrelevant have rapidly become a necessity to everyday life. Whilst the benets
of adopting the mobile phenomenon are signicant, users are nevertheless vulnerable to the ex-
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tent that increasingly personalised information is being entrusted to a third party. The latter
issue has arguably enjoyed less attention and only surfaces in cases of severe security or privacy
breaches. The context of mobile crime reporting is however somewhat unique in this respect as
users are seemingly more risk averse to privacy loss in this setting. Law enforcement agencies
therefore need to ensure that they obtain and retain public condence in their ability to man-
age the data about reported incidents appropriately; especially when third parties are granted
access to perform analysis on their behalf.
The framework outlined by Burke and Kayem [7] consisted of two modules, namely: (1) a
data collection module and (2) a data anonymisation module. Our focus is rmly on the latter
where we hope to improve on the manual anonymisation process in their original framework.
The majority of our work is therefore dedicated to automating the anonymisation process whilst
maximising information utility by using a GA.
1.1 Motivation
A framework and relevant practical considerations for mobile crime reporting in a developing
country was introduced by Burke and Kayem [7]. Within that context reports about crime are
collected by a law enforcement agency who is the owner of the data. The owner of the data
has a duty to maintain the privacy of crime reporters not only from a moral perspective but
also from a personal safety perspective.
As mentioned earlier the law enforcement agency might however want to analyse the reported
crime data to help facilitate its statutory role of enforcing the law. Crime prevention, avoidance
and proling are amongst the few benets obtained by crime data analysis. Adequate volume
and quality of crime data also assist in allocating scarce resources more eciently across law
enforcement departments within the context of a developing country. One practical example
might be to apply Bayesian techniques to assess what police unit should be dispatched to a
reported crime scene given only the location and time of the event. One might be able to
dispatch the correct unit with highest probability given only those two factors for instance.
Within a developing country it is unlikely that the required expertise will be available within
the law enforcement agency itself to conduct statistical analysis of the data. Such analysis may
therefore need to be done by a third party which raises privacy concerns. There is a denite
need to minimise the probability of disclosing the identity of a crime reporter explicitly or
implicitly. Burke and Kayem [7] addressed this by anonymising the data prior to sending it
to the third party for analysis. Figure 1.1 shows their implementation. [39] summarises the
notion of statistical disclosure and cites works related to it. We will again turn our attention
2
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to the various forms of disclosure and attacks on anonymised data in Chapter 2.
Figure 1.1: Crimemod implementation
We have already noted the inherent trade-o between the benets derived from crime data
analytics and the risk of identity disclosure. It is worth pointing out that there might be
additional complexities when outsourcing crime data analysis to a third party. We consider the
following scenarios as examples:
• Crime data in particular might be valuable to foreign intelligence agencies. They might
be able to identify groups hostile to the ruling government and use this information to
attempt to inuence local politics
• The third party may be located in another jurisdiction where laws relating to privacy
might dier. This could make it dicult to take legal action should any breaches of
privacy occur as a result of the data release
• Reported crime data may be released to the third party before any arrests have been made
or suspects taken into custody. Where the data has not been adequately or appropriately
anonymised, disclosure might assist a suspect in avoiding arrest if he can identify that
the crime he committed has been reported. In this instance some co-operation between
the third party (who is analysing the anonymised data) and the suspect is required
Whilst the above examples are not exhaustive it demonstrates the need to ensure sucient
anonymity requirements when sharing crime data with a third party.
3
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Challenges and limitations relating to the collection of reported incidents were addressed in
Burke and Kayem [7]. We further note that biases may be introduced into the data through
this form of data collection. By biases we mean that the reported frequency distribution of
crime reports diers from the true frequency distribution. We provide some insights into how
this can occur within the framework of Burke and Kayem [7] and how such biases might be
addressed during the anonymisation process.
Anonymisation of data requires specic resources and within the context of a developing country
numerous limitations need to be contended with. The skills shortage has already been alluded
to earlier and is seen as the most signicant constraint - however limitations on computational
power and time constraints should not be underestimated. The budget of a law enforcement
agency in a developing country may not allow for expensive computing devices (such as a server
farm for instance) dedicated to the anonymisation of data only. On the other hand anonymised
data should be available in a timely manner and not take hours or days before it is available.
Third parties will require timeous responses to their requests for anonymised data.
The three limitations above are what we will consider as parameters that control the "resource
constrained environment". In this paper we seek to develop an automated scheme for selecting
the appropriate level of anonymity to address the skills shortage within a law enforcement
agency. Our selection of algorithms and techniques for automated anonymisation are then
informed by the associated time and computational complexities.
1.2 Problem
Collected crime reports within the mobile crime reporting framework (MCRF) of [7] are stored
in a database. These records need to be anonymised before making it accessible to third parties.
Whilst the anonymisation module of [7] provides an algorithm used to anonymise the data before
sending it to the third party, the levels of k-anonymity and l-diversity are pre-dened inputs
set by a specic security hierarchy. This thesis explores the following questions derived from
this setting:
i Can the crime data anonymisation be automated and to what extent is automation possible?
For instance, domain generalization hierarchies (DGH) may still need to be specied for
attributes unless a suitable automation scheme can be found for this
ii How can data utility be improved from the perspective of third parties if we do not know
what analytical tools will be used to extract information?
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iii Will the selected automation procedure cope with the dynamic nature of the data source
in terms of computational power and time constraints? Crime reports are generated fre-
quently resulting in signicant growth in the dataset. Ideally most recent reports should be
included as anonymised records in data queries but can this be done in real-time given our
constraints?
1.3 Contribution
The overarching theme of this work is to consider the automation of data anonymisation for
crime data, specically within the MCRF setting described in [7]. Related topics are also
covered - some extensively - with the aim of supporting and enhancing our main automation
goal. Although a unique crime reporting setting was chosen for our implementation, extension
of ideas to other elds would seem straightforward.
In a quest to reduce user intervention during anonymisation whilst maximising the utility of
the data, this paper therefore contributes the following:
1. We dene a crime weighting scheme which facilitates the automation aspect of our work
as we no longer need to set the level of k-anonymity or l-diversity based on the end user
as was required in [7]
2. A modied loss metric (LM) is incorporated into the GA to ensure that end users can
select which quasi-identiers (QIDs) they seek to prioritise during the anonymisation.
This adds exibility and improves data utility for third party users as they can tailor the
anonymised output to better suit their needs
3. We employ a genetic algorithm (GA) approach called "CrimeGenes" (CG) to derive
Pareto optimal solutions such that information utility is maximised whilst achieving a
required level of k-anonymity. Our GA implementation for k-anonymity is referred to as
CG-kanon
4. We propose CG-diverse (based on l-diversity) to address the vulnerabilities of CG-kanon
to inference attacks. Our crime severity scheme is modied to suit CG-diverse whilst the
QID weighting scheme is retained. Our CG-diverse targets diversity directly rather than
implementing it as an extension of k-anonymity. This improves optimisation eciency
and enables us to shorten the algorithm runtime. To the best of our knowledge there has




5. Our work lastly introduces the notion of biases introduced by the MCRF (the meaning
of biases was given in Section 1.1). We look at how such biases may come about and the
impact of this on data utility. We propose an adjustment factor to compensate for such
biases although we do not extensively discuss experimental results related to this due to
the scope of our paper
6. We conduct experiments in Chapter 5 to evaluate our contributions as set out above and
show that a GA is indeed practical to implement an automated anonymisation scheme
within our resource constrained environment
The implementation of our contributions above are done in a manner that is practical and
usable1. A web-based interface ensures platform independence from the user's perspective.
Server-side implementation is also exible with ODBC providing the required linkage between
the Python-based server and the Java anonymisation engine. Our proposed automation feature
is therefore simple to implement on the existing MCRF from [7] as modularity is retained with
the only dependency being the original database of crime reports.
1.4 Outline
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature
related to our main contributions as set out above. Chapter 3 gives a succinct description of the
design of our automation scheme including technical specications relevant to our implemen-
tation. Chapter 4 and 5 together constitute the largest component as far as the body of this
paper is concerned - here we set out the implementation and results respectively. Chapter 6
concludes by presenting a summary of our ndings whilst recommending avenues of further
research based on this.





Literature related to publishing data whilst retaining privacy has grown substantially in recent
years. We present a directed review of related work aimed at supporting our automated genetic
algorithm (GA) approach for the MCRF. An exhaustive review of the literature can be seen to
be a separate work in itself when looking at [18] for instance.
2.1 Privacy and information
The mere availability of information creates a need for analysis if we believe that some value
might be extracted from it. In our specic setting such value is derived form the social ben-
et of reducing crime through the MCRF. Chapter 1 mentioned that advances in computing
capacity of mobile devices and networking technologies has facilitated the integration of elec-
tronic devices into everyday life. Society's capacity to generate data has similarly expanded
and with it a growing demand to make sense of it all. This is countered by concerns about
privacy which have come to the fore in recent years. As a result the data environment is far
more complex than a few decades ago and so too the privacy issues related to it. It might be
helpful at this early stage to point out that cryptography should not be confused with the eld
of anonymisation. Cryptography in a most general sense seeks to protect access to data by
making it unintelligible. Anonymisation on the other hand seeks to maximise the value of data
without disclosing (intentionally or unintentionally) an identity or specic attribute.
Where traditionally, as noted by [39], privacy loss was mainly seen as a function of the actual
data released, unintended disclosure incidents such as those by Netix or the well documented
case mentioned by [49] of the Massachusetts Governor who was identied through publicly
published medical records resulted in new approaches to privacy preserving data publishing
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over the last 20 years. The two core issues that most contemporary research seeks to address
can be summarised as follows:
1. External data. Uncertainty as to what data is available to third parties and not under
direct control of the data publisher complicate risks of disclosure attacks
2. Information utility. The inherent trade-o between privacy and information loss is well
researched and proven to be NP-hard as mentioned in [10]. This trade-o has prompted
us to incorporate the notion of Pareto optimality. The Pareto optimal front comprises
the set of points where no more data utility can be achieved for a given level of privacy.
Incorporating this requirement into our GA ensures optimal results with respect to infor-
mation utility post anonymisation. Section 2.5.2.1 considers the Pareto optimal front in
more detail
Privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP) is often used in the literature to refer to the connes
created for data publishers by the two concepts above. Privacy preserving data mining (PPDM)
is a related term and seeks to provide a solution to the problem of PPDP by applying data
mining tools. Data mining is generally an information centric activity and hence the adoption
of such techniques needs to be applied with the necessary privacy restrictions. Literature on
PPDM varies widely but the following two approaches can broadly be distinguished:
1. Anonymise and data mine. The most common approach here is to modify the
anonymisation algorithms to optimise some data mining metric or methodology. Works
by [24],[2],[19] and [44] all utilise data mining tools to measure the performance of their
anonymisation schemes. In cases where the anonymisation algorithms are not modied,
data mining techniques can still be applied to measure or compare utility of anonymised
datasets for data mining purposes post anonymisation.
2. Mine, then anonymise the released data. The data owner performs data mining
on the private data and then publishes the results in a manner that satises anonymity
requirements. Alternatively the mining and anonymisation approach may be combined
into a single process as was done in [17]. Here an algorithm is derived that induces decision
trees that satisfy the k-anonymity requirement. We note however that this approach may
not be as practical where granular attributes are present as large decision trees would be
required. Furthermore such induced decision trees, geared mainly towards classication,
may overgeneralise the data.
The above two categories for PPDM are dened by [10] although that work was published
in the context of k-anonymity only. We propose this distinction is appropriate for PPDP in
general.
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PPDP has become more inuential due to problems involving big data requiring automated data
analytics. Implementation frameworks such as the widely cited Weka1 software in [21] has also
facilitated experimentation and applications in practice. However, appropriate performance
metrics for PPDM are still debatable - we return briey to consider this in Section 2.4.
Before proceeding with an overview of some specic privacy models, we consider it necessary to
distinguish between dierent kinds of data to which anonymisation methodologies are applied.
Traditionally, research on privacy preserving data releases was focussed on the notion of data
records contained within a database. Within the MCRF this is still the primary focus as we are
dealing with database entries pertaining to crime reports. More recently however two additional
areas within the eld of data anonymisation have emerged. These are:
• Transactional data anonymisation can in a general sense be thought of as the data
and data linkages inherent in consumer spending data. The paper by [51] describes this
developing area of anonymisation as well as the specic nuances particular to it. Instances
where retailers or nancial institutions seek advice from a third party consultant serve as
a practical example where such techniques may be employed. The application of PPDM
in this instance to develop association rule learning is particularly useful. Such techniques
are used to learn about consumer preferences and purchasing behaviour whilst retaining
anonymity. [58] gives examples of how particular consumers may be at risk of privacy
loss unless PPDM is utilised instead of pure data mining. Both [51] and [58] propose
algorithms for ensuring PPDP in transaction data
• Network-based anonymisation is an area receiving much attention deriving its sig-
nicance from increased internet and intranet usage over the last decade. The explosion
of online social networks has created new ways of applying and thinking about anonymi-
sation as described in [4]. Here nodes and edges within the network serve as inputs to
model disclosure risk. The tendency for users to prefer mobile services has also raised
concerns about location data and how this may be anonymised without compromising
the relevance of content provided to users. The paper by [55] covers such related issues.
Concerns about location privacy are relevant in the MCRF where mobile phones are used
for reporting although utilising location data is not something we have focussed on in our
implementation.
The above two areas are more recent developments in the literature when compared to data





i New branches of anonymisation require techniques which dier signicantly from tradi-
tional database approaches. It might therefore be inappropriate to apply anonymisation
algorithms in one eld to another due to the unique challenges faced in each
ii The underlying data in these emerging elds can be seen to be behaviour-centric i.e. that
behaviour drives and determines what data can be derived and investigated. The traditional
database approach is dierent in the sense that it provides a mapping between an individual
and a set number of variables
iii The scope of behaviour-centric data can make it more dicult to properly dene the dis-
closure issues in every instance. There may also be varying degrees of overlap with other
elds such as privacy or cryptography depending on the context
It can be seen that what makes transactional and network-based anonymisation dierent is
due to fundamental dierences in the underlying data. We note these emerging areas only in
passing as our focus in this work remains rmly on relational data as described earlier.
A number of privacy models have been derived over the years to address the need for PPDP
of relational data. We provide an overview of such models in the following section before
considering a selection of these models in more detail.
2.2 Privacy models
Borrowing terminology from [13] we distinguish between syntactic privacy models and proba-
bilistic privacy models.
2.2.1 Syntactic models
Syntactic models have well-dened data output formats for the anonymised data where privacy
traits can often be conrmed by visual inspection of the data. Particular disclosure risks are
identied in advance and the anonymisation scheme is devised with a specic set of scenarios in
mind. These scenarios take into account amongst other factors the information that might be
available to an attacker as well as the syntactic and semantic meaning of the underlying data
being generalised. K-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness and almost all the variants of each of
these fall under syntactic models.
Our focus in this paper will be solely on syntactic models as we apply principles from k-
anonymity and l-diversity to a GA implementation. The fact that syntactic models have a
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xed format and well-dened output perhaps make this more tractable from a GA perspective
compared to a probabilistic denition of privacy. A GA seeks to create an individual with
specic features and characteristics. A syntactic model is analogous in this respect as the
anonymised dataset has predened characteristics as well.
2.2.2 Probabilistic privacy models
Perturbation techniques are possibly the most well-known category of probabilistic privacy
models. Here noise is added to values in a dataset to conceal the true values whilst ensuring
that statistical properties of the data are invariant to the transformation. [15] points out that
there are two categories for perturbation techniques, namely Input perturbation and Output
perturbation. The former randomly modies the data before answering queries based on the
modied data. The latter approach uses the original data to derive query results, these results
are then randomly modied. [15] further note that due to privacy limitations discovered in
initial perturbation techniques further research in this area was dampened. One such limitation
was where the magnitude of noise added to a value was used as the metric for privacy. The
data was vulnerable to inference attacks from an adversary who knew the true underlying
distributions of the data.
A more recent probabilistic approach which sought to overcome the initial criticisms of pertur-
bation approaches was published by [14]. This was known as dierential privacy and has also
been the focus of quite substantial research in this eld in recent years. Dierential privacy in
simplistic terms requires that an adversary learn no more from a published dataset when one
record (or individual) is present in the dataset compared to if that record (or individual) was
removed. The uninformative principle as introduced by [20] and cited in [18] encapsulates this
requirement and seeks to limit probabilistic attacks on anonymised data.
Whilst the syntactic and probabilistic models introduced above clearly approach privacy is-
sues for published data from dierent perspectives they do face some common challenges. For
instance both need to contend with the issues surrounding continual publishing of data. Sec-
tion 2.3.7 of this paper looks at this problem from the perspective of syntactic models. On the
other hand, the paper by [16] seeks to address this problem from a dierential privacy point of
view.
Lastly, we note there have been eorts to create hybrid models which aim to combine the
best attributes of both approaches. The probabilistic k-anonymous implementation of [2] and
the dierential privacy combination with t-closeness by [13] are two such examples. Whilst
probabilistic models are better suited to the anonymisation of numerical data, syntactic models
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are more appropriate for categorical data. In our MCRF the majority of attributes in the dataset
are categorical. For the remainder of this chapter we therefore focus solely on research related
to syntactic models and we now turn to explore these further.
2.3 K-anonymity and its extensions
2.3.1 K-anonymity
The k-anonymous model as rst introduced by [49] has dominated much of the literature related
to privacy preserving data publishing. The following denitions will enable us to formalise the
notion of k-anonymity and will be used elsewhere in the paper.
• Tuples. Since our data structure is contained within a database a tuple is equivalent to
one record entry or a row in the database
• Attributes. Within the context of a database an attribute can be interpreted as the
columns of a row. The attributes are therefore data elds which when combined create
a tuple (or row). The set of attributes may include explicit (name, identity number or
surname) or general identiers (gender, postal code or ethnicity)
• Quasi-identiers (QIDs). These are attributes which independently or when combined
can be used to uniquely identify an individual or entity. Most often such identication is
done by combining external data with the published dataset
• Sensitive attribute. The attribute which, when combined with the QIDs, would result
in a disclosure
• Equivalence class. [33] dene an equivalence class as "a set of records that have the
same values for the quasi-identiers"
• Disclosure. The unintended loss or reduction of privacy for an individual or entity
resulting from a publication. [33] note that two types of information disclosure can
be identied namely, identity disclosure and attribute disclosure. 'Identity disclosure
occurs when an individual is linked to a particular record in the released table. Attribute
disclosure occurs when new information about some individual is revealed. The released
data makes it possible to infer the characteristics of an individual more accurately than
it would be possible before the data release'
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• Adversary. Any entity seeking to extract more information from the released data in
order to achieve a disclosure
Figure 2.1 shows how the denitions above relate to a sample anonymised dataset.
Figure 2.1: An anonymised dataset
Using the above terminology we can informally state that a dataset is said to be k-anonymised
if for every entry there exist exactly k-1 records in the anonymised dataset with the same QIDs.
Equivalently, the equivalence classes of a k-anonymised dataset contain at least k entries. An
adversary is therefore at best able to target a specic individual with probability 1
k
given the
QIDs. The above attack is what the k-anonymous model was specically designed for - to
reduce the probability of successfully linking a record or entry to a specic individual. The
fact that this approach still poses inferential vulnerabilities is well-known. For instance in our
MCRF we may have an equivalence class consisting of 10 reported crimes where 9 oences
relate to murder and only 1 to theft. Where an adversary knows the QIDs of a crime reporter
they are therefore able to state with 90% certainty that the reporter reported a murder.
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Although the inferential risks in k-anonymised data are addressed to a large extent by l-diversity
in Section 2.3.5, a signicant body of literature is aimed at improving algorithmic techniques
for its implementation. We consider the various adaptations and permutations of this model in
what follows.
Two of the most well-known earlier extensions for k-anonymity were published in [30] and
[31]. These implementations are commonly known as Incognito and Mondrian respectively.
The Datay algorithm presented in the original k-anonymity work by [49] whilst a rst step
towards implementing a k-anonymous model gave no guarantees about optimality. The work
in [30] sought to address this shortcoming and utilises a bottom-up approach. A lattice is
constructed of possible generalisations before a traversal of the lattice seeks to nd the minimal
generalisation that satises the k-anonymity requirement. A number of k-anonymity algorithms
are based on dierent generalisation structures. A brief digression to consider such structures
would be helpful at this stage before we pursue our current line of thought in Section 2.3.3
concerning various k-anonymous algorithms.
2.3.2 Domain recoding
A more thorough understanding of generalisation techniques will enable us to better appreciate
the dierences between anonymisation algorithms in the literature. We use the notion of recod-
ing and generalisation interchangeably. Whilst some of the literature provides extensive formal
denitions of recoding domains we restrict our discussion to an informal descriptive approach.
We distinguish as follows between the two recoding models in the literature:
1. Global or full domain generalisation. For each attribute, the occurrence of a specic
value within that attribute is generalised to the same level. For example if the age 18 is
generalised to the range 18_87 for one tuple then all tuples with age attribute of 18 are
generalised to 18_87.
2. Local recoding. Local recoding models are agnostic of generalisations applied to the
same attributes of other tuples in the dataset. For instance one tuple with age attribute
of 18 can be generalised to the interval 18_23, the age of another tuple can be left as 18
and another tuple can have age generalised to 18_87.
Although [30] utilised a full domain generalisation model (as in [49]) they point out that local
recodings are likely to provide much better information utility.
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The denition as presented above may provide an over-simplied view of generalisation models
in the literature, the following caveats and additional discussion points therefore need to be
kept in mind:
• One can further distinguish between single and multi-dimensional global recoding models.
For instance [31] applies a multi-dimensional generalisation approach within a global
recoding framework to create anonymised data with more utility. As pointed out by [42]
this implies that only tuples within the same equivalence class have the restriction that
attributes are generalised to the same level.
• [42] does not, however, use the notion of global versus local recoding even though their
proposed cell-based generalisation approach is clearly a local recoding model. They also
speak of single dimensional generalisation when referring to full domain generalisations
whereas in [30] this terminology is utilised with specic meaning
• The above two points allude to the fact that the terminology used in the literature as
pertaining to generalisation models has not been entirely formalised yet, or at least is not
being applied consistently
• Lastly, not mentioned above is yet another distinction between hierarchical generalisation
and partition-based generalisations. A total ordering is required for the latter which makes
it better suited to numerical or continuous attributes. The former is naturally better
suited to dealing with categorical data. The paper by [5] was the rst to apply partition-
based generalisations to k-anonymisation. All attributes in the QIDs are considered as
an ordered set and the anonymisation algorithm is framed as a set-enumeration problem.
We return to this below when furthering our discussion about k-anonymity extensions.
Our focus on generalisations may look to imply that the only tool for achieving k-anonymity
is through recoding the QIDs space to obtain equivalence classes. However as shown in [59]
a permutation-based approach is equally viable and they show that it guarantees the same
privacy as generalisation-based approaches. Their main motivation is that better answers are
obtainable for aggregate queries using permutation-based anonymity than the more common
generalisation approach.
As noted by [59] however, their own approach only seeks to break the link between the QIDs
and the sensitive attribute and does not address other forms of linking attacks. Furthermore
they demonstrate that numerically sensitive attributes need to cover a sucient range of values
within a group to provide sucient privacy. Otherwise an adversary might be able to infer a
value in close proximity to the actual value for individuals in the same group. This they state as
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(k, e) anonymity. Here the parameter e requires that the range of distinct sensitive attributes
span a range e. For instance if the sensitive attribute is an individual's salary then a value of
5000 for e will require that within the same group the maximum and minimum salary in that
group diers by at least 5000.
In a related work by [56] the QIDs are separated from the sensitive attributes into two tables
and then connected through a group ID - [56] called their approach "anatomy". However as
noted by [59] this approach can be seen to be equivalent to permutation of sensitive attributes
in the same group. Anatomy also does not allow for sucient privacy of numerical sensitive
attributes which puts it at a disadvantage in this respect.
We now return again to review other k-anonymous algorithms equipped with an overview
of domain generalisations. It should be noted that our focus later in this paper will be on
implementing a local recoding model to exploit the benets shown in [42] from using cell-based
generalisations as they refer to it. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the additional information that can
be gained through local recoding as compared to global recoding. The example shows a dataset
where 2-anonymity was applied. We see that rstly the local recoding approach can produce
more equivalence classes and secondly that those equivalence classes contain more granular
information.
2.3.3 K-anonymity extensions
The overview above relating to domain recodings enables us to consider the Mondrian algorithm
in [31] as an improvement on the Incognito algorithm in [30]. Whilst Incognito is focussed on
optimality it is exponential in time complexity and therefore quite slow. The aim of [31] was
to improve computational speed to achieve reasonable results whilst improving information
retention post anonymisation. The former was achieved by adopting a partitioning approach
whereas information utility was improved by using multidimensional hierarchies. The top-down
greedy algorithm implementation of Mondrian was shown to be O(nlog(n)) in time complexity
which was a signicant improvement. The partitioning, however, requires a total ordering to
be established. [8] cites this as one of the drawbacks of Mondrian even though it is ecient.
Other top-down approaches
Whilst [31] above can also be classied as a top-down approach the work by [5] and [19] serve
to contrast two quite dierent implementations of a top-down algorithm. Contrasting these
two approaches bring out further insights into aspects of the literature.
1. K-Optimize. The K-Optimize algorithm in [5] assumes total ordering of the QIDs and
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Figure 2.2: Local versus global recoding example
this ordering is used to index the attribute values. The optimal search algorithm is
exponential in time and uses the indices associated with the attribute values as part of
its set-based manipulations to derive an optimal anonymisation. [5] points out that they
sought to remain cost agnostic but provide two example metrics for use in their results,
namely a discernibility metric and a classication metric.
The results presented by [5] included an interesting comparison with a hybrid algorithm.
This algorithm sought to combine the speed of greedy anonymisation algorithms with the
better information utility of stochastic anonymisation algorithms. In a similar fashion to
GAs this model had no stopping criterion but continued a stochastic hill-climbing exercise
to recursively improve on information loss whilst satisfying the privacy level. Exact further
details of this implementation were not given, but could be of value for comparison with
our GA implementation as there are few stochastic benchmarks for anonymisation in the
literature.
2. TDR The TDR algorithm of [19] uses hierarchical generalisation. In [5] the main focus of
their implementation was to generate useful anonymised data for classication purposes.
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[19] argue that optimal generalisations as presented in [5] are not necessarily optimal for
classication. They propose that cost metrics based on the original data and used as
a feedback loop in the anonymisation process are less eective for classication. They
reference the fact that data mining and machine learning classication techniques are
often less eective on the unmodied data even when the unmodied data has the lowest
possible cost metric. Other optimal k-anonymisation algorithms seek to minimise error on
the training data and thus overts the classication model. TDR therefore uses "noise"
and "redundant structures" to minimise classication error on out-of-sample anonymised
data.
Whilst both TDR and K-Optimize start out at the broadest generalisation and rene the
granularity until the level of k is reached, their implementations and observations are quite
dierent. Most notably that dierent opinions exist about cost metrics and that the notion of
optimality may often be context specic. This sets the scene for Section 2.4 where we comment
on the use of cost metrics in the literature.
More recently machine learning approaches have been applied to the anonymisation process.
This has not been restricted to only k-anonymity. The notions of clustering and classication
in particular have cultivated a signicant body of literature focussed on PPDM.
2.3.3.1 K-anonymity as a clustering problem
[8] were the rst to consider k-anonymisation as a clustering problem and provide an algorithm
for its implementation which incorporates a classication metric. They show computational
complexity of their algorithm is in O(n2) and therefore in the same order as algorithms seen
prior to this. [26] notes however that [8] is sensitive to outliers as it sequentially selects clusters
furthest from each other to construct a new cluster. They also suggested that the time com-
plexity can be improved by sorting the QIDs and when this is done their algorithm is faster in
O(n2/k). Their systematic approach nds k- anonymity in a greedy manner and adds records
to clusters such that information loss is minimised. They also propose that for a given pop-
ulation a percentage q might be indierent to having their records published. These records
can then be published as is without loss of information. Their algorithm incorporates such
records into the anonymised dataset after other records have been anonymised. This reduces
total information loss and improves computation speed. This concept could be incorporated in
the MCRF through the user interface. One would however need to consider whether users are
able to determine their desired privacy prospectively and especially under duress following a
crime incident.
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An earlier work by [34] also aimed to improve on computation time using a clustering approach.
Their algorithm is based on the K-Means algorithm and is implemented as a two stage process.
Firstly the clusters are created in a randomised fashion. By creating n
k
initial clusters (where
n is the number of records and k the level of k-anonymity) the number of clusters (and hence
equivalence classes) are maximised. The second process called the adjustment stage modies
the clusters to ensure each cluster does contain at least k entries. The algorithm utilises a
randomised approach for cluster creation during the rst stage and therefore some clusters
may be close to containing k records but not exactly. Both [34] and [26] implement their
algorithms using the Adult Census data on the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository and
benchmark their results against the original clustering approach by [8]. Both yield substantial
computational time reduction compared to [8] whilst minimising their chosen information loss
metrics.
[41] provide another utility driven clustering measure but enable the data publisher to include
expert knowledge about data features that might assist (or are critical) to maximizing the
anonymised data - they implement this as data constraint rules as part of their algorithm. They
provide an example about distinguishing between ages 20 and 21 for publishing anonymised
data for alcohol-related research where the drinking age limit is 21. This concept might be
incorporated in our setting if crime categories are related to age partitions. However our par-
ticular crime classication scheme does not lend itself to this in its current form. Conceptually,
however, such data constraint rules could be dened once-o by an expert and incorporated in
the automated anonymisation scheme to further maximise data utility for third parties. We do
implement a QID weighting scheme aimed at indirectly improving data utility.
The work by [42] was introduced in an earlier section where we considered recoding models.
Whilst their approach also applies clustering, more relevant to our resource constrained envi-
ronment is the notion of a natural domain generalisation hierarchy (NDGH). Without reporting
the technicalities involved we cite their results whereby an NDGH is used in an automated fash-
ion to specify the domain generalisation hierarchy. For our automated anonymisation within
the MCRF this would be desirable as user input for the generalisation scheme becomes obso-
lete. Our implementation in Chapter 4 assumes a once-o specication of the generalisation
hierarchy. However this may need to be redened in future as the MCRF grows and develops.
An appropriate NDGH may be considered as a possible solution going forward to automate
this component of the implementation as well.
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2.3.3.2 Classication and k-anonymity
Classication has been mostly applied to assess utility of datasets post anonymisation. Nev-
ertheless one model which directly applies this data mining tool by integrating it into the
anonymisation process is the work by [17]. [17] provide a one-step process to create a classica-
tion model that also satises k-anonymity. They achieve this by training a tree-based classier
(such as the ID3 algorithm or the improved C4.5 algorithm) and modifying the algorithm to
check for k-anonymity of the classication tree at each node. Whilst not directly of use in our
work this may be considered as a quick and ready approach should the law enforcement agency
themselves seek to publish a classication model that meets a specied privacy level.
2.3.3.3 Genetic algorithms and K-anonymity
The rst such attempt and by far the most widely referenced work was by [24] where the
GENITOR algorithm from [54] was applied to achieve k-anonymity for the Adult dataset. A
general loss metric as well as a classication metric was used for experimentation. He used
this to infer that anonymisations with more utility are obtainable where the data mining or
analytical techniques to be used on the data are known in advance. However the counter
argument noted earlier by [19] about the relevance of cost metrics for classication accuracy
should be kept in mind. Whilst his GA approach and also loss metrics have some drawbacks,
it was nevertheless a pioneering approach given work prior to this. The criticisms one could
make are possibly more suited to drawbacks of GAs in general of which complexity and long
execution times are most signicant. These two limitations have meant that applications of
genetic algorithms to k-anonymity have been less widespread than some of the other techniques
mentioned above. Works by [40] and [35] are amongst these more rare implementations. They
also approach the k-anonymous solution from quite dierent perspectives (terminology used
below relating to GAs will be introduced later when GA implementations are discussed):
• [40] used a GA called data mining privacy by decomposition (DMPD) to partition the
dataset into distinct groups such that each satises k-anonymity. They note that since
each disjoint set does not contain all QIDs it is easier to achieve k-anonymity within each
partition. In a similar manner to [31] they avoid the need for a generalisation hierarchy by
their partitioning approach. The DMPD also ensures k-anonymity is retained should an
adversary rejoin the various partitions. The algorithm is design to optimise classication
accuracy and therefore performance is measured by training the C4.5 and Naive Bayes
classiers on the anonymised data.
At a more technical level the DMPD algorithm seeks to nd an optimal feature set par-
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titioning. Such feature set partition was introduced by [44]. The work in [40] is therefore
essentially based on the GA approach given in [44] but extended to suit k-anonymity with
a classication goal. The k-anonymity restriction and classication metric enter the t-
ness function as part of the multi-objective optimisation process. The SPEA2 algorithm
from [60] formed part of DMPD to ensure Pareto optimality for selected solutions. This
is the same selector utilised in CrimeGenes and we elaborate on this later. Unlike DMPD,
CrimeGenes utilises a local domain recoding without the focus on classication.
• [35] use a clustering technique to segregate the dataset provisionally by grouping tuples
with similar QIDs. The grouped tuples are then generalised such that all attributes in
the same tuple are generalised to the same level to form an equivalence class. The GA
is applied at this later stage to minimise information loss to optimise the generalisations
applied to the various equivalence classes. The Michigan approach is used for their GA
whereby all chromosomes (equivalence classes in this case) together form the solution set.
This is in contrast to the Pittsburgh approach whereby each chromosome in the popu-
lation represents a solution. CrimeGenes utilises the Pittsburgh approach. Section 2.5.3
discusses this aspect of GA in more detail.
The above demonstrates that the exibility provided by GAs enable their usage in dierent
forms and at various stages in the anonymisation process. A GA can be applied to either fully
take over all aspects of the anonymisation process or it may be introduced selectively (in a
modular fashion) to perform a more specic task in the anonymisation process. Specics of
GAs in the literature are reviewed briey in Section 2.5 when we will revisit some issues alluded
to above.
2.3.4 K-anonymity limitations
The limitations of the K-anonymous model have been well documented throughout the litera-
ture. We point to the limitations most relevant to our implementation of CrimeGenes rather
than aiming to provide an exhaustive review of the topic.
The original work by [49] which introduced the model was accompanied by three limitations
namely, unmatched sorting attack, complementary release attack and the temporal attack. The
latter two limitations are both related to sequential or repeated releases. This is particularly
relevant to our proposal for CrimeGenes where we consider a sampling approach to releasing
the data. Section 2.3.7 covers sequential releases as a separate topic owing to its relevance.
Inferential attacks are arguably the most likely risks when only using k-anonymity for PPDP.
The problem derives from the fact that the model does not enforce any restriction on the distri-
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bution of sensitive attributes within an equivalence class. We may end up with an equivalence
class where all sensitive attributes are equal and thereby forgo the privacy k-anonymity seeks to
ensure. We see an example of this when looking at equivalence class 1 in Figure 2.3. Although
5-anonymity is achieved for both equivalence classes we can state with high probability that
a particular individual with QIDs for equivalence class 1 reported a murder. To address this
specic shortcoming l-diversity introduced in the next section was devised by [38].
Figure 2.3: Inference attack on 5-anonymous crime data
The NP-hardness of k-anonymity requires higher order time complexities to ensure optimal
results. [9] notes that therefore the complexity for optimal solutions will be exponential in
the size of the QID. Admittedly most recent heuristic algorithms can achieve acceptably good
results for practical application, but nevertheless from a theoretical stand-point optimality
remains computationally expensive. Since no bounds on eciency and optimality of solution
can be placed on heuristic approaches, experimentation has been a crucial aspect of applying
such approaches to prove the worth thereof. The metrics used to evaluate each of these may
be debatable especially as selection of performance metrics might be subjective and suited to
reinforcing the validity of the proposed algorithm.
The curse of dimensionality as shown by [1] means that a large number of QIDs results in
unacceptably high information loss. This derives from the fact that with many QIDs the
probability that k tuples in the raw data are similar becomes very small. From a practical
perspective this implies that accurate specication of a minimal QIDs set is desirable. For
most practical cases we have encountered this has not yet been a problem however it clearly
does not preclude all instances and one needs to remain cognisant of this limitation.
[12] discusses an often overlooked distinction between k-anonymity as amethod and k-anonymity
as a policy to preserve privacy. Whereas the former is well documented and understood we
may overlook the context within which we apply this anonymisation technique. This is where
the notion of policy is important. For example, as [12] points out, from a social perspective
we might want to ensure that there is extra protection for elderly and young people when per-
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sonal data is published. However because k-anonymisation essentially aims to provide equal
protection across tuples, this is not achieved. Another scenario might be where anonymised
crime data for a particular region was published and this has an impact on an employer hiring
candidates from that area. If a candidate is from a suburb where reports of drug abuse have
been particularly high, for example, the employer may be less likely to hire the candidate based
on the published data. As a method k-anonymity has served to preserve the privacy of oend-
ers, however, this should be weighed against the possible unfair discrimination that innocent
parties may suer subsequently.
The limitations of k-anonymity discussed above can be seen to range from being quite technical
to including more softer issues such as policy and social contexts. In spite of these limitations
k-anonymity has nevertheless been a useful and widely used tool. In applying it to published
data we should however be mindful that some limitations do exist and that its appropriateness
for a given scenario needs to be judged accordingly.
2.3.5 l-diversity
l-diversity was proposed by [38] and simply stated requires that the most frequently occurring
sensitive attribute in any equivalence class should not occur more frequently than 1
l
. Consider
an equivalence class for anonymised data in the MCRF with 10 tuples where "Theft" is the
most common crime in that equivalence class. If we require 5-diversity then "Theft" cannot
occur more than twice in this equivalence class. Note that another interpretation of this is that
there should be at least 5 distinct sensitive values per equivalence class since any given sensitive
value cannot occur more than twice.
The above denition is what [38] referred to as distinct l-diversity (where the term l-diversity
is used elsewhere in the paper this is the form we are referring to if not stated otherwise). They
did however provide two additional stronger forms of diversity, notably entropy l-diversity and
recursive l-diversity.
• Entropy l-diversity is based on information entropy, but [38] shows that this may be too
restrictive as it implies a minimum aggregate level of entropy across the whole table.
• Recursive (c, l)-diversity ensures that the most frequent sensitive value occurs frequently
enough but the most infrequent value not too infrequently.
We note that whilst the three denitions of l-diversity (and specically distinct l-diversity)
may not be complicated the implementation, as with k-anonymity, is crucial so as to obtain
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ecient algorithms for achieving l-diversity in reasonable time. Therefore in a similar fashion to
k-anonymity there have been multiple implementations of l-diversity in the literature to date.
For instance [56] and [59] introduced earlier and based on permutation both allow for l-diversity.
In an attempt to minimise the number of passes over the data for an anonymisation algorithm
[43] present "instant anonymisation" as an alternative which satises both k-anonymity and
l-diversity. There have been several other implementations not covered here. However as with
k-anonymity there are also shortcomings and these are summarised by [33] as follows:
• l-diversity may be unnecessary. The necessity for l-diversity is dependent on the
distribution of sensitive attributes in the dataset. Where values in the sensitive attribute
have extreme probability mass functions (i.e. some values have very high frequency and
others very low frequency) l-diversity may result in signicant information loss and may
be unnecessary therefore.
• Skewness. l-diversity only considers the frequency of specic values in an equivalence
class and not the entire distribution for values in that equivalence class. This is arguably
the most common limitation of l-diversity and mainly the shortcoming which t-closeness
proposed by [33] seeks to address.
• Semantics. Whilst an l-diverse equivalence class may contain sucient variation in
sensitive values there is no way to capture the semantics of those sensitive values. An
example for the MCRF might be where one equivalence class satises 2-diversity say, but
only contains reported crimes Disorderly conduct, Vandalism, Theft. Where an adversary
knows the QIDs for an individual they might gain additional information by learning
that a less serious crime was reported. This is in contrast to an equivalence class contain-
ing only Murder, Rape and Arson where the adversary knows that a serious crime was
reported.
To the best of our knowledge l-diversity has not been widely applied using GAs. This may
be partly due to the expansion in the search space when introducing another requirement into
the tness function. However [18] note that an l-diverse set is also k-anonymous such that the
level of k is equal to l. We might therefore be able to get away with only seeking l-diversity
using the GA and thereby obtain a minimum level of k-anonymity as well. This is what our
CG-diverse algorithm achieves.
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2.3.6 t-closeness
t-closeness addresses the skewness limitation of l-diversity by 'requiring that the distribution
of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class is close to the distribution of the attribute in
the overall table' as stated in [33]. They propose the Earth Mover's Distance (EMD) as the
appropriate metric to determine the similarity of distributions. EMD has been popular as an
image retrieval technique such as in [45]. Here histograms of images are compared using EMD
before retrieval from a database. However, the EMD arguably lacks the statistical grounding of
measures such as the Chi-squared test which [45] also compare the EMD against. [45] provide
further comparisons of dissimilarity measures. However, actual results obtained by [45] for
these measures as applied to image retrieval have little bearing on what might be suitable given
our focus on anonymity in crime data.
There have been attempts to consider the statistical roots of EMD likening it to the Mallows
distance such as in [32]. [52] also gives more sound statistical grounding for the EMD, a measure
being largely derived from its engineering applications. By applying EMD (traditionally an
engineering tool) to computer science, [45] seemed to have sparked interest into rening the
calculation of EMD to make it more ecient for use in large data applications - such algorithms
have been given by [36],[57] and [25].
[33] refer to future work that might be considered for t-closeness, such as having multiple
sensitive attributes. Here one needs to consider two attributes separately and then require
that an equivalence class has t-closeness if both attributes have t-closeness separately. Another
way is to consider the joint distribution of attributes but in this case EMD cannot be easily
extended.
The notion of syntactic and probabilistic privacy models was covered earlier. As pointed out in
that section the paper by [13] aims at bridging the divide between these two dierent philosoph-
ical approaches. In particular their work combines k-anonymity for the QIDs and dierential
privacy for the sensitive attributes to develop a "stochastic" t-closeness. Such hybrid models
have been proposed elsewhere but to date not tested as extensively as either of these approaches
separately. Further renements in the literature might make these more suitable for widespread
implementation in future.
Applying t-closeness to our work would require another order of complexity beyond l-diversity,
which, given our resource constrained environment, would not be feasible under the time con-
straints. Measures to reduce the runtime for k-anonymity and l-diversity are considered in
Chapter 5. Another complication with t-closeness is that we know that a lower t-value is better
but how do we evaluate the marginal improvement from a lower t-value. [33] mention that a
combination of EMD and the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence might be a better approach to
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address this question. It can be shown that the KL divergence measures relative information
entropy and we return to consider it again when looking at utility metrics in Section 2.4.
2.3.7 Sequential releases
Sequential releases of anonymised data have been somewhat less studied in the literature than
the anonymisation techniques themselves. Recently, however, there has been more focus on
this issue and since our CrimeGenes implementation is based on a dataset that will continually
grow and expand we briey review literature related to this topic.
One of the rst works focused on sequential releases in PPDP was [53]. [18] reviewed develop-
ments in this eld and [47] grouped their ndings into the following categories:
• Multiple releases. Here dierent views or partitions of the data are released at the
same time. This is not applicable to our CrimeGenes implementation though
• Sequential releases. [46] dene this as "several releases of the same table are published
over a period of time, where each release contains a dierent set of the table attributes".
This can be seen to be applicable to our work if the MCRF develops and possibly other
QIDs are required
• Continuous data. Records are inserted and deleted over time and several releases of
the same underlying table are published over time
The work by [53], [47] and [46] are all primarily concerned with sequential releases (as dened
by [47] above). Here the notion of k-linkability and k-diversity are dened analogous to the
denition of k-anonymity and l-diversity respectively. [47] describes these two requirements as
follows:
• k-linkability ensures that a combined view of all releases (here tables with dierent at-
tributes) will not enable an adversary to link any of the QIDs in the tables to less than
k distinct sensitive attribute values
• k-diversity requires that an adversary is not able to link any selection of values of the
QIDs with any sensitive value with probability greater than 1
k
[53] was the rst to consider issues related to sequential releases, however, their top-down
algorithm only focused on instances where there are one prior release of the data. [47] extended
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this to consider multiple prior releases. A cell-based generalisation approach was implemented
and the addition of tuples was allowed for. According to [46] this was the only study at the
time of writing that combined continuous data and sequential releases. There were nevertheless
drawbacks to the implementation of [47] most notably that the algorithm depends exponentially
on the number of releases and that later releases may suer from reduced information utility
due to restrictions imposed as a result of previous releases. [46] addresses these shortcomings
by presenting an algorithm that (1) satises a stronger notion of privacy, (2) time complexity
is independent of the number of releases and (3) data utility for a release is independent of the
release sequence.
We can see from the above discussion that a sequential release in itself requires sophisticated
algorithms, which, when combined with a GA approach for anonymisation may require a series
of related research works. Due to the more limited scope of our work, which only focuses on
continuous data, we therefore opt for a simpler scheme to deal with multiple releases on our
crime reported data. Specically we look at releasing anonymised samples without replacement.
This requirement is necessary as due to the randomness of our GA anonymisation and the
weighting facility provided to third parties, an unacceptably high risk of disclosure is introduced
if previous samples are replaced. We will revisit this issue again later when we discuss our
implementation.
2.4 Anonymisation metrics
Earlier in our review of the literature we encountered opposing views about using cost metrics
during the anonymisation process. In this section we look at cost and utility metrics in more
detail.
2.4.0.1 Cost metrics
[24] was one of the rst implementations to utilise a cost metric. There have subsequently
been numerous cost metric permutations aimed at improving data utility, including our own.
Divergent views exist, however, about whether such metrics are useful. For instance [42] suggest
that information loss metrics are questionable and show little correlation between one metric
over the other in terms of ecacy of classication afterwards. [31] on the other hand are in
favour of cost metrics, in particular pointing to general-purpose cost metrics as a good starting
point when the purpose of the data is unknown to the data owner. Similarly [29] note the
ndings by [42] but show that their own results indicate that lower information loss is related
to better classication accuracy using their NSVDist (Non-homogeneous generalization with
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Sensitive Value Distributions) algorithm. The paper by [12] notes that numerous works in
the literature utilise cost metrics but they express concern that such uniform analysis metrics
(UAM) assign the same weighting to attributes when optimising data anonymisation. They
question whether this is appropriate since from the perspective of inference attacks, for instance,
some attributes may be more useful to an adversary. This is an interesting aspect and our
attribute weighting scheme introduced in Section 4.4.3 is closely related to this idea.
A cost metric in itself could serve as a metric to compare anonymisation algorithms. However
in much of the literature the use of cost metrics have been restricted to the optimisation
process itself and not to assess the appropriateness of the end result. The variety of cost metric
denitions also make it dicult to nd a standard means for assessing the relationship between
cost metrics and data utility. A large number of works select classication as the appropriate
data utility measure.
2.4.0.2 Classication
Classication accuracy has arguably been the most popular measure of data utility post anonymi-
sation. Whilst there are denitely instances where this is desirable there are numerous uses of
data post anonymisation and we should not be conned to classication accuracy as our only
benchmark. Poor classication accuracy may be a symptom of the underlying data and not the
anonymisation process itself. One should also distinguish between classication of anonymised
data and classication of data that is regenerated from an anonymised dataset. The latter does
not induce spurious accuracy whereas the former could. The work by [22] evaluates various
uses of anonymised datasets mainly from a classication perspective. Since the focus of our
work is not on optimising anonymised data for classication we do not elaborate further on this
utility metric. Instead we turn our attention to arguably a more universal metric which would
lend itself better to being agnostic of data usage post anonymisation.
2.4.0.3 Kullman-Leibler divergence
The KL divergence was briey introduced earlier during our discussion of t-closeness. We
pointed out in that section that the KL divergence provides a measure of information entropy.
We formalise this notion here from a statistical perspective by referring to the work of [27]. They
show the relationship between KL divergence and maximum likelihood. Maximum likelihood
is well documented in the statistical literature and widely used for statistical inference. This
observation would suggest the KL-divergence provides a more standard measure for assessing
anonymised datasets from a statistical perspective which is also more independent of its usage.
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The KL divergence considers the original data as coming from some multivariate distribution
without making any assumption about the specic distribution. It then measures the "distance"
or "closeness" of the anonymised data to that original distribution. Some adjustments and
assumptions are needed in the anonymised data to make it suitable for the KL measure. We
cover these later in Section 4.10. LpNorm is yet another metric used for utility however we do
not cover it here.
Whilst there are clearly divergent views about utility metrics for anonymised data we propose
that the overarching principle should remain the same. The chosen metric should reect the
purpose of the anonymised data. Utility metrics alone should not be totally relied on without
looking at qualitative aspects of the data as well. Summary statistics may conceal privacy issues
which could easily be detected through inspection of the data. As k-anonymity and its various
extensions never guarantee total privacy, utility metrics should always be weighed against the
opposing privacy risks.
Our review of the literature thus far indicates that the anonymisation of data is a multidi-
mensional problem where factors can often be diametrically opposed. This complexity lends
itself to the use of genetic algorithms (GAs). This is because a GA approach enables us to be
less concerned about how the optimisation takes place and more with what the results should
look like. The next section concludes our literature review and considers aspects of GAs most
relevant to our work.
2.5 Genetic algorithms
The use of genetic algorithms in anonymisation of data have been more limited than other
techniques. Works applying GAs and referenced in this paper include [24],[44] and [35]. This
section covers concepts related to GAs relevant to our implementation and whilst not focused
entirely on anonymisation are nevertheless required to appreciate specics of our proposed
solution.
2.5.1 Preliminaries
Genetic algorithms could be seen as a branch of the broader machine learning literature. GAs
have, however, only recently become more feasible for practical real-time applications as com-
puting power has increased and become more aordable. An example of this might be to
compare the rst GA for anonymisation presented by [24] which took 18 hours to run in 2002
to our CrimeGenes implementation producing useful results after 30 minutes. Admittedly the
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dierences between the two implementations do not warrant a direct comparison, but never-
theless this should give an idea about the order of magnitude by which runtimes have improved
over the last decade.
Genetic algorithms are inspired by the observation that physical dierences between species of
the same kind in nature are attributable to their genetic make-up. Often very small dierences
at the chromosome level can lead to signicant dierences in appearance. In an analogous
manner we seed our GA with chromosomes that are suited to the particular problem at hand.
Each chromosome provides a solution set by applying a slightly dierent approach to solving
the problem. We generate a large number of these chromosomes randomly (within limits for
the particular kind of problem) to ensure that a suciently large variety of possible solutions
are combined into the gene pool. The chromosomes can be represented by binary strings (as
was done for earliest GAs) or by text strings as done in our CrimeGenes implementation.
Once the required number of randomly generated chromosomes are available, systematic and
iterative processes are employed to generate new chromosomes which better resemble the desired
solution. Operators such as selection, mutation and cross-over are typically employed to achieve
this. Chapter 4 of our implementation will expand on particulars of a GA in more detail. For
the moment we consider a specic class of GA known as evolutionary algorithms (EAs) which
are better suited to solving multi-objective problems.
2.5.2 Evolutionary algorithms
Evolutionary algorithms are one particular class of genetic algorithms well-suited to solving
multi-objective problems. They have successfully been applied in a variety of elds accompanied
by a large and growing body of literature. We therefore present a concise overview of the most
relevant concepts for our implementation below. We use the terms evolutionary algorithm and
genetic algorithm interchangeably going forward as the former is a subclass of the latter.
2.5.2.1 Pareto optimality
Pareto optimality is based on the notion that no single optimal solution exists to a given problem
but rather that the solution space consists of a set of optimal points. As dened in [28] "a Pareto
optimal solution cannot be improved with respect to any objective without worsening at least
one other objective". Pareto optimal solutions are applicable where multiple but conicting
factors determine the solution. It is therefore not possible to optimise the outcome with respect
to all inputs as inherently a trade-o exists to achieve the result. Pareto optimality is well-
studied in Economics for that reason. In our setting the trade-o for anonymisation exists
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between information utility and privacy. This we seek to solve with the GA approach. The
other trade-o to consider is the resource constrained environment within which we operate
where time, computational capacity and a skills shortage needs to be considered. This latter less
quantiable problem relating to constrained resources requires judgement more than numerical
analysis and we consider such related issues where appropriate throughout the paper.
Returning to the Pareto principle we point out that EAs for multi-objective problems seek to
derive an approximation to the Pareto optimal set, more specically the Pareto optimal front.
Such solutions are commonly referred to as non-dominated solutions. However it is worth
pointing out that EAs for multi-objective problems are quite dierent from EAs for single
dimensional problems. In particular there are two major dierences as highlighted by [11]:
• Multi-objective EAs require a selection mechanism based on Pareto optimality. Using
GA terminology, the selection mechanism refers to the process of selecting only the ttest
individuals to breed the next generation of results. The Opt4J framework of [37] which
we implemented requires one to choose such a selector. As mentioned in Chapter 5 this
is where we opted for the SPEA2 algorithm as proposed by [60]
• Amechanism to ensure sucient variation in the population is required for multi-objective
EAs to avoid the solution converging to one point in the solution space. Convergence to
a single point is desirable for single dimensional EAs but not multi-objective EAs which
often need to derive a set of optimal points
The SPEA2 (Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm) referred to above and the NSGA2 (Non-
dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm) are two well-known algorithms designed to give Pareto
optimal results.
2.5.3 Pittsburgh vs Michigan approach
The Pittsburgh and Michigan approach refers to a design feature of GAs and relates to how the
chromosomes are constructed for modelling a solution. The dierence between these approaches
can be summarised as follows:
• Pittsburgh. Here each chromosome represents an entire solution to the problem. In our
CrimeGenes implementation one chromosome is therefore one possible anonymisation of
the entire dataset
• Michigan. The Michigan approach is dierent in that all chromosomes combined rep-
resent a single solution for a problem. This approach would require the dataset to be
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broken up such that dierent chromosomes model dierent tuples in the dataset. The
solution is then created by combining all chromosomes.
CrimeGenes implements a Pittsburgh approach. The work by [35] uses a Michigan approach
by constructing chromosomes out of partitions used during a clustering pre-processing step. As
noted in [35] care needs to be taken since the index of each tuple in the dataset should occur
exactly once only when dealing with anonymisation. Therefore applying a mutation operator on
the chromosomes in this setting would invalidate the generalisation. We are therefore restricted
to cross-over operations only.
Work in other areas such as [23] have specically explored the merits of using either approach,
albeit in a very dierent setting. From a design perspective the Pittsburgh approach is simpler
to construct. Generally, however, we note that the Pittsburgh approach requires more memory
and computational capacity especially as the population size is increased. Consider a dataset
with 100 records where the GA has a population size of 100. The algorithm therefore needs
to handle 1002 genes whereas with a Michigan approach there are still 100 genes irrespective
of the population size. With the Pittsburgh approach it is however possible to introduce more
variation into the optimisation process and therefore convergence to the Pareto optimal front
might be quicker. Where computing capacity and memory capacity enables such implementa-
tion this might be desirable. One could of course reduce the population size in a Pittsburgh
setting where memory constraints exists, however, this negates the benets to be derived from
a larger gene pool during optimisation. A redesign of the problem might be preferred in that
case in order to implement a Michigan-based approach.
In the CrimeGenes setup our sampling approach reduces the gene pool signicantly and there-
fore problems with memory capacity were avoided. However, one should remain mindful of
such restrictions when designing the GA and we again revisit this issue briey in Chapter 5.
2.5.4 Stopping criterion
A number of works in the GA literature are dedicated to deriving the appropriate stopping
criterion for the algorithm. The meta-heuristic nature of EAs and exibility provided for
specifying and solving complex multivariate problems comes with the drawback that placing
a limit on the runtime is less well-dened. The paper by [3], although less contemporary,
demonstrates attempts to specify upper bounds for GA computation times to facilitate their
practical implementation. One reason why a more standard approach for terminating the GA
has not been adopted might be attributed to the fact that there are dierent priorities for
dierent implementations of a GA. In our case for instance the practical considerations for the
32
2.5. GENETIC ALGORITHMS
resource constrained environment dictates where our focus should lie. The algorithm can not
consume inappropriate amounts of time and computing power. However, in a purely research-
based setting theoretical aspects of a problem override the need to achieve immediate results
and the algorithm can run for hours or days. Nevertheless we briey state possible approaches
for terminating an EA and our thoughts on how relevant these are for CrimeGenes.
Possible termination criterion might be one (or a combination) of the following:
• Maximum number of iterations (generations)
• Limit on execution time. Here a distinction is required between the notion of time
from a user's perspective (user-dened time) and CPU time (CPU time). A computing
device may be interrupted when other resources require CPU time. This delays the GA
and user-dened time is increased
• No new pareto optimal solutions. The algorithm terminates if there are no new
non-dominated solutions in the archive after a set number of iterations or after a pre-
determined user-dened time
• Variance of tness values. This approach was given in [6] and the GA stops once
the variance of non-dominated solutions (i.e. the values for their tness functions) is
below a specied value. The diculty here, however, is in setting the appropriate level
given variations in the data going forward as well as user preferences in terms of attribute
weightings introduced later in our work
Other termination criterion are covered in the literature, however we view the above as most
relevant to our implementation. CrimeGenes sets a limit on the user's perception of time before
terminating the optimisation. A note on CPU time is perhaps appropriate in this regard. As
the number of concurrent third party users requesting data increases, a set limit based on
user-dened time will reduce the quality of results produced. This should be kept in mind and
monitored during and post implementation. In such cases a more appropriate stopping criteria
might be to set a limit on the number of generations (iterations) through an experimental
process as done for the time limit in CG.
This concludes our review of topics in the research literature related to our work. The following




The contribution of this paper focuses on a subset of the original MCRF introduced by [7]. The
schematic in Figure 3.1 demonstrates how our implementation known as "CrimeGenes"(CG)
relates to the original MCRF. [7] focused on a broad range of issues ranging from mobile users
doing the crime reporting to considering privacy issues for such data released to third parties.
Interfaces between the framework components were also set out in some detail by [7].
We see from Figure 3.1 that our focus with CG is directed at the anonymisation aspect of the
MCRF. In a modular fashion, we seek to provide an automated anonymisation scheme whereby
data utility is maximised through a genetic algorithm(GA).
3.1 System requirements
Whereas the MCRF introduced and focused on the mobile aspect of the framework, we seek to
extend the anonymisation capability of the original framework and focus on making the data
accessible to end users for information or analysis purposes. In light of this the following design
considerations are taken into account:
1. End users should be able to access data (obtain output) through a single integrated
platform in a secure manner that is user-friendly. Here users include both law enforcement
ocials and external third parties
2. The system should provide data output with automated anonymity based on minimal user
intervention. It is worth remembering that data anonymisation is a means to preserve
privacy. In this respect our requirement here for automated anonymisation can be seen to
be closely related to the notion of privacy by design (PbD). We do not elaborate further
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Figure 3.1: CrimeGenes anonymisation
on PbD in this paper, however the reader is referred to [48] for a concise introduction to
this eld in the privacy literature
3. The data returned should reect most recent crime reports as far as possible whilst still
adhering to anonymity constraints
4. Scalability is important to ensure that growth in volume of data (crime reports) and data
users (third parties and law enforcement sta) can be accommodated
5. The CG implementation should be modular and be easily integrated into the existing
MCRF implementation or another crime reporting system if needed
3.2 Module components
We implement our solution using a web interface whereby a user requesting anonymised data
obtains such records through a web browser. A web-based system has the advantage of be-
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ing more accessible provided adequate internet connectivity exists. There are however also
downsides of which security is possibly the main concern.
To provide an integrated interface for all data users we propose a design combining database
and web technologies. There are three main modules: A database module, the anonymisation
engine and the web server. This section provides a brief outline of each module.
3.2.1 Database
We selected PostgreSQL (version 9.1) as our database management system. PostgreSQL is open
source software and widely used in a variety of applications. A large development community
has ensured that seamless integration with Java and Python is possible - all other major pro-
gramming languages are also supported. The original MCRF implemented a MySQL database.
It should be noted that our implementation utilises a separate database management system
(DBMS) solely dedicated to the management of the CG data. To facilitate this we require a
form of log-shipping to synchronise new reports from the original MCRF database to the CG
database.
An alternative approach would be to use the original MCRF database and only add additional
tables to handle requirements for CG. Whilst an additional database requires twice the storage
capacity, this has to be weighed against the modularity retained through our current implemen-
tation. We have chosen the latter approach for the time being due to the exibility it provides
going forward should any modication be required.
3.2.2 Anonymisation engine
The anonymisation engine implements the GA which optimises the level of information for a
given degree of anonymity. Our denitions for anonymity are introduced in Section 4.6.1 and
Section 4.4.3 as k-anonymity and l-diversity. We call the respective algorithms CrimeGenes-
kanon (CG-kanon) and CrimeGenes-diverse (CG-diverse).
The anonymisation engine is implemented in Java using the Opt4J framework from [37]. Java
was selected for this module to facilitate parallel processing where multi-core or multiple proces-
sors are available. The engine uses multi-objective optimisation algorithms to obtain a Pareto
optimal set of solutions. In particular we use the SPEA2 algorithm developed by [60] as a se-
lector for the GAs of both CG-kanon and CG-diverse. The need for a selector was discussed in
Section 2.5.2.1. Our preliminary testing did not suggest a signicant dierence between SPEA2




Figure 3.2: CrimeGenes anonymisation algorithm
3.2.3 Web server
3.2.3.1 Server side
The web server is written in Python and based on the Flask web framework. Gevent which
is a coroutine-based network library is included to handle high I/O requirements should the
number of users or requests grow over time. Gevent does not constitute parallel processing but
instead eciently manages queues to increase performance where I/O demands are high. This
is typical for a web server where database queries need to be managed and web pages retrieved
for users.
To provide dynamic content for web pages web sockets using the socketIO protocol are utilised.
Interactive data is transferred between server and client in JSON format. Once a user has
conrmed an anonymisation request the web server initiates the anonymisation engine with the
requested parameters and the appropriate data sample. The anonymised data is saved in CSV
(comma-separated values) format and emailed to the user once the runtime for the anonymi-
sation engine is completed. Whilst our experimental implementation did not use encryption, a
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private/public key encryption scheme is proposed to ensure data integrity and security during
transfer. The le containing the anonymised data would be encrypted by the law enforcement
agency with the public key of the third party before the le is emailed. The third party can
then decrypt the le with their own private key.
3.2.3.2 Client side
Users of the interface are assumed to be computer literate to the extent that they can interact
with a graphical user interface - therefore a command line interface is not appropriate. These
two assumptions are aligned with our setting of a resource constrained environment - users are
more likely to prefer a graphical user interface.
The user interface is created using client side technologies including HTML, JavaScript and
Angular JS. From a user's perspective any suitable web browser would suce to access the
system1. Secure sockets layers (SSL) is proposed for all web trac. Access rights will be set
by user group. Authentication to access the online system utilises a combination of password
and one-time-pin (OTP) made available per user on a daily basis. 2
The requirement for an OTP was thought necessary as the system is web-based and therefore an
extra level of security seemed appropriate. We may however consider two-factor authentication
(TFA) as yet a further security enhancement. TFA typically combines some prior knowledge of
the user (e.g a password) with a physical device owned by the user (e.g. an electronic token or
a cellphone) during the authentication process. This makes unauthorised access more dicult
as an adversary requires access to both the password and the physical device which use should
be restricted to the intended user only. In our scheme the OTP is sent by email to the user on a
daily basis and the OTP is valid for 24 hours. Slight modication of our proposed scheme would
satisfy the requirements for TFA if, for instance, we send an OTP for each requested login to
a user's cellphone instead. Whether this is practical from a third party's perspective might
be debatable. For instance, managing registered cellphone numbers for sta at dierent third
parties might become dicult due to sta turnover at such third parties. From this perspective
using only a daily OTP and company email addresses at a third party might be easier, but the
lower level of security needs to be weighed against this.
For the purposes of our research the exact details of this aspect are perhaps beyond the scope
of this paper. However, if implemented in practice issues around security from the client side
1A demo implementation can be found at http://197.189.230.18:85
2The online demo version uses OpenID for user authentication and not the authentication scheme above.









We begin this section with a description of the data and salient characteristics pertaining to
crime data. This will set the scene for Section 4.3 where we look at appropriate generalisation
hierarchies for this data. We then introduce the various components of our implementation
known as "CrimeGenes" (CG) starting with a modied loss metric in Section 4.4.
4.1.1 Crime data in general
In order to devise an anonymisation scheme for crime data we require a classication system
for oences. Categorisation of crime data can vary signicantly due to the categorisation of
oences being driven by several factors which could include:
• Legal jurisdictions - the classication of oences may dier signicantly across states,
provinces and countries
• The time period over which crime data is collected and analysed - consider the rapidly
evolving eld of cyber crime. A few decades ago such classication hardly existed.
In line with [7] we utilise the FBI classication scheme to derive categories for our crime data.
This also facilitates comparison of our automation scheme with the original MCRF.
The table in Figure 4.1 shows a sample extract from our generated crime data which consisted
of 10000 records. We kept the same attributes for our data as was specied in [7] for the original
MCRF but generated our own data to ensure more records can be easily added if required. The
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attribute distributions are shown in Figure 4.2. The frequency distribution of reported crime
types is exactly the same as in the original MCRF.
Figure 4.1: Sample of generated crime data
Before proceeding we introduce the following notation related to our dataset to be used later
in our discussion:
• Oc is the reported number of oences in category c where c ∈ C
• C denotes the categories of oences
• O represents the total number of observed reports across all categories
4.1.1.1 Generation of dataset
Figure 4.2 shows our assumed distributions in generating our crime data. Brief comments
relating to these distributions are given below.
The frequency distribution of crime categories in Figure 4.2(c) was taken from the original
MCRF. From this distribution crimes were generated and randomly assigned to various tuples.
The fact that reported crimes were randomly assigned to tuples meant that we did not infer any
correlation between crime categories and attributes of the crime reporters. The implications
of this are that we should not expect high classication accuracy for the raw data as well as
anonymised data. This was done specically to avoid spurious accuracy by not generating data
suited to a specic performance metric. Instead our generated data could be viewed as a worse-
case scenario and this is preferable to measure the merits of our anonymisation approach.
Our selected generalisation hierarchy in Section 4.3 is also specied with this is mind. The
hierarchies for Age and Suburb are both very granular which results in a large number of




(a) Reporters (b) Age
(c) Reported crime categories (d) Time of crime occurrence
Figure 4.2: Attribute distribution assumptions
Our age distribution in Figure 4.2(b) implied that younger individuals were more likely to
utilise the MCRF. This is because younger individuals are expected to be more comfortable
with mobile applications when compared to older individuals. The reporter type distribution
in Figure 4.2(a) assumed that the likelihood of someone acting as a proxy was lower compared
to a victim or witness reporting a crime. The reasoning here was that in general reporters
should have condence in the system to preserve their privacy. Therefore, only in severe cases
of trauma following a crime, or where there was extreme fear of privacy loss would a proxy
report be made. Lastly, we assumed that in general crimes were less likely to occur and be
observed during the very early hours of the morning as shown in Figure 4.2(d). By this we mean
that both occurrence and observance had to take place. Some crimes are possibly more likely
to occur at night (especially serious crimes), however, fewer witnesses are awake to observe
and report crimes. The distribution for the time of occurrence was included for completeness
only in order to be consistent with the attributes of the original MCRF. We did, however, not
include this as a QID when implementing our anonymisation algorithms.
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4.1.2 Crime reporting specics
This brief section introduces points unique to crime reporting which should be kept in mind
for when we cover anonymisation of crime data and the subsequent analytics to be performed
on this data by third parties.
• Reporting issues. Reports may be misclassied for closely related crimes if reporters
confuse two categories. There may also be multiple reports about the same incident.
This needs to be taken into account when publishing the data as observations will be
skewed
• Distribution of oences. The distribution of reported crimes is likely to be skewed towards
less serious crimes. The combined frequency of less severe crimes is likely to be higher
than for serious crimes, i.e. we would expect a larger proportion of reported crimes to
consist of less serious crimes
• Moral hazard. The fear of being identied may result in reporters misrepresenting per-
sonal information whilst only stating facts relating to the crime accurately. Some reporters
may go further and misrepresent facts about the crime itself if they believe that revealing
certain facts about the incident may put them or their relatives at risk. Unfortunately
there is little one can do to address this issue in practice
• Selection bias. There might be various forms of selection bias due to income, education
or ethnicity. For example, the fact that a mobile phone is required to report a crime
introduces a selection bias whereby specic crimes may be reported more frequently than
others due to the reporter belonging to a specic income band. For instance, we might
expect a relatively higher incidence of petty crimes reported from residents living in a
higher income suburb than lower income suburbs even though the actual frequency of
petty crimes might be higher for lower income areas. The impact of perceived severity
and propensity to report a crime skews the data relative to the true distribution of crimes.
These last two points might lead us to consider means of countering such biases through
our anonymisation before making the data available to third parties for analysis. The
additional information available to law enforcement from prior experience or data gathered
might assist in deriving such adjustment factors. These adjustment factors might be
used to optimise information utility. This notion of an adjustment factor appears quite




[7] stated that all attributes for crime data are considered sensitive and presented algorithms
to deal with multiple sensitive attributes. The underlying nature of the reported data means
that users of the MCRF are acutely aware of the personal and privacy risks associated with
it. Use of automated location information through triangulation for example or fear of corrupt
law enforcement ocials might deter the public from reporting crimes if they feel their privacy
is at risk.
The notion of privacy can take many forms. For the purposes of this paper we seek to preserve
privacy by only using k-anonymity and l-diversity. As covered in Chapter 2, we are well aware
of the limitations implied by this. However besides the usual challenges of retaining both data
utility and privacy we are faced with additional trade-os in our resource constrained envi-
ronment where time and computational complexity also plays a role. Hence whilst additional
privacy measures could be introduced for an automated genetic algorithm(GA) implementation
in the MCRF we do not cover those in this paper.
4.3 Specifying the domain generalisation hierarchy
In this section we dene how we will structure the generalisation hierarchy for the various
attributes making up our crime data. We consider only manual construction of such taxonomies
in our implementation. Automated means for generating the attribute taxonomy as given by
[42] do exist. Their work introduces the concept of a natural domain generalisation hierarchy
(NDGH). However as pointed out in [42] such automated domain generalisation is NP-hard
and given the complexity to solve for optimal anonymisation using a genetic algorithm the
combination of NDGH with a GA approach would seem less feasible given time constraints in
practice. We therefore restrict our focus to constructing manual attribute taxonomies.
The original MCRF by [7] being based on the Datay algorithm used global recoding after
prioritising attributes for generalisation to suit crime data (namely numerical attributes such
as age were generalised rst) in an attempt to reduce information loss. Our attempt to pro-
vide third parties with more information utility is focused on using a local recoding to avoid
over-generalisation. We combine this with a weighting scheme on the QIDs as discussed in
Section 4.4.3 to provide further exibility from a third party's perspective. Our manual gen-
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Gardens . . . Vredehoek
One of the main drawbacks related to manual specication of the attribute taxonomy is knowl-
edge required by a user to select appropriate taxonomies. As the MCRF grows and adapts this
problem could be seen to become more accentuated. Ideally we would like to automate the
attribute taxonomy especially in a resource constrained environment. The NDGH mentioned
above might be an appropriate starting point.
4.4 Information loss
The trade-o between information loss and guaranteeing privacy for crime reporters is one
of the central themes of this work. Towards achieving an optimal anonymisation we require
metrics for both these inputs. Privacy for our purposes will be dened in terms of the level of
k-anonymity and l-diversity in Section 4.6.1 and Section 4.6.2 respectively. The loss metric we
dene in this section is an adaptation of the original general loss metric (LM) introduced by




4.4.1 Information loss notation
• A is the attribute space with a ∈ A where a is one specic attribute (a column in the
crime data table)
• T (a) denotes the generalisation taxonomy dened for numerical attributes a ∈ A. Let
T (a)max and T (a)min be the upper and lower limits respectively for the generalisation of
the numerical attribute a ∈ A. Furthermore dene td,n(a)max and td,n(a)min as the upper
and lower limits of the current generalisation for attribute a in tuple d during iteration n.
• K(a) denotes the generalisation taxonomy dened for categorical attributes a ∈ A.
K(a)total is dened as the total number of leave nodes generated by the taxonomy tree
K(a). P is the number of nodes created by K(a). k(a)p is the sub-tree rooted at node
p ∈ P . k(a)p,total is the number of leave nodes in the sub-tree rooted at node p ∈ P
4.4.2 The original loss metric
Denition 4.4.1 (Original general information loss). Using our own notation we can now
dene the general information loss as specied in [24]. Due to both numerical and categorical








T (a)max − T (a)min
if numerical
(4.1)








4.4.3 CrimeGenes loss metric
Here we introduce our weighting scheme for the loss metric which enables end users to priori-
tise specic attributes during anonymisation. By this we mean that an end user requesting
anonymised data can dene which of the QIDs should contain more information whilst still
adhering to a given privacy requirement. In Section 4.6 we introduce two anonymisation algo-
rithms called "CrimeGenes-kanon" (CG-kanon) and "CrimeGenes-diverse" (CG-kanon) where
both implement the same CG loss metric.
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Our motivation for weighting the loss metric is that we do not know how the anonymised
data will be used. Data mining tools for classication or clustering might be applied to the
data. Users may simply want to get more insight into the distribution of a particular attribute.
Although the skills shortage in our resource constrained setting lies with the law enforcement
agency, third parties performing analytics should not have this problem. They could benet
from being able to modify the anonymisation to best suit their particular use case.
Using notation introduced earlier we dene the CG loss metric before returning to issues relating
to the practical implementation of introducing such exibility for third party users: We dene







wa × ILd,n(a) (4.3)
Where:
• wa is the weight assigned to attribute a ∈ A by the end user. The appropriate weight for an
attribute is case specic and usually involves an iterative process. A user's weightings are
typically informed by output from previously generated samples (issues around sampling
and related disclosure risks are covered later).
• ILd,n(a) as dened earlier
4.5 Crime severity weighting
We introduce a crime weighting scheme to facilitate an automated anonymisation approach
based on the severity of an oence. This paper considers guideline sentences for oences as
an appropriate weighting mechanism, although some work is still required in a South African
context to determine such guidelines.
One such paper by [50] looks at the possibility of guideline sentences for oences in South
Africa whilst referencing the eorts of the state of Minnesota in the United States. Minnesota
has implemented their guideline sentence framework since 1980 according to [50] and publishes
revised guidelines on an annual basis. At the time of writing the latest available guideline titled




The complexity of the Minnesota guideline together with dierent crime categories (compared to
South Africa) makes direct application of this guideline impractical for our purposes. However,
the framework nevertheless gives valuable insights into how a guideline sentencing framework
has been applied in practice. The implementation of such a framework adds weight to our
notion of using standard weightings for our anonymisation process.
Figure 4.3: Crime severity weightings
We denote the crime severity weight as S(c) where c ∈ C. C denotes the list of oences
as shown in Figure 4.3 and S(·) maps the crime category to its weight, which is simply the
guideline sentence duration (in years) for that crime. For instance S(theft) = 5. Since the
sentencing duration for a given crime could be interpreted as the severity with which society
as a whole views a particular oence we propose using this measure as a proxy for the risk to
a crime reporter of privacy loss. For example, the risk of privacy loss for reporting a murder is
in general higher than for reporting a misdemeanour.
4.6 Achieving automation
As stipulated in the previous section our automation is premised on the assumption that a
crime severity scale exists where such severities are representative for society as a whole. Our
implementation is known as "CrimeGenes" (CG) and we explore two automated anonymisaton
algorithms for CG which employ a GA approach.
The denition of privacy for the anonymised data is what distinguishes the two algorithms
- one algorithm is based on k-anonymity (CG-kanon) and one on l-diversity (CG-diverse).
Inferential attacks on anonymised data from CG-kanon required us to consider CG-diverse to
enforce stricter privacy constraints.
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The crime severity scale facilitates automation but our choice of a GA ensures that information
utility of the anonymised data is maximised given the privacy constraints dened by such a
crime severity scale. In this section we contrast the crime severity schemes of both CG-kanon
and CG-diverse and discuss how the GA component diers between the two approaches.
4.6.1 Understanding CG-kanon
As covered in our review of the literature, the notion of privacy dened by k-anonymity seeks
to hide tuples with the same QIDs in a group of k. For CG-kanon we propose using the crime
severity scheme in Figure 4.3 to hide tuples for more severe crimes in larger equivalence classes.
For instance, we would like a report about amurder to satisfy 20-anonymity whereas an incident
of theft should be shown in an equivalence class satisfying a lower level of say 5-anonymity.
It is important to take note of the following points about CG-kanon:
• Our notion of hiding more severe crimes in larger equivalence classes implies nothing
about the absolute level of k-anonymity for dierent crime categories. It is instead a
relative statement about the level of k-anonymity for dierent crimes in the anonymised
dataset. The severity weighting is converted to a severity penalty which is used by the
GA. We elaborate on this later
• An absolute level of minimum k-anonymity is therefore required, we denote this by kmin.
The purpose of kmin is to guarantee a global minimum level of k-anonymity that all
equivalence classes must adhere to. The GA then uses kmin as a baseline level for k-
anonymity whilst moving tuples into appropriate equivalence classes based on their crime
severity. kmin will be dened in more detail below
• The GA of CG-kanon uses the crime severity scale, kmin and the CG loss metric as
input parameters for optimisation. The loss metric was introduced in Section 4.4. Once
these parameters are provided the GA takes over the entire process until optimisation is
complete. Section 4.9 will provide further insights into details of the GA for CG-kanon
4.6.1.1 kmin for CG-kanon
We introduced kmin above as the minimum level of k-anonymity for the dataset as a whole.
Here we dene it and comment briey on its interpretation:




• kconstant is a xed minimum level of k, in our implementation this was set at 5
• SD(·) is the set of all severities for the dataset D
The denition for kmin shows that the global minimum level of k-anonymity is set either at a
xed level of kconstant or at the lowest level of crime severity in the specic dataset if this is
higher than kconstant. For instance if kconstant is set at 5 and the lowest crime severity weight in
the dataset is 3 then kmin will be 5. However if the lowest crime severity weight in the dataset is
7 then kmin will be set to 7. Our denition for kmin therefore ensures that an adequate minimum
k-anonymity will be set for datasets regardless of the reported crimes in those datasets.
kconstant can be seen to be a subjective parameter used to increase the global level of k-anonymity
independent of entries in the dataset. By setting kconstant too high we will reduce the impact of
crime severity on kmin. For instance, if kconstant = 10 datasets with minimum crime severities of
5 or 7 will be anonymised to satisfy 10-anonymity. We therefore suggest keeping kconstant close
to the lowest crime severity weighting in most cases to allow crime severity to dictate kmin.
However, if for any reason the need arises to raise the minimum level of k-anonymity, kconstant
can be set higher for this purpose. For our implementation kconstant was set at 5 which was
marginally higher than the lowest crime severity of 3. For crime data a minimum 20% chance
of positive disclosure seemed more appropriate than a 33% chance using 3-anonymity, however
this was purely subjective. It can be seen that how the crime severity scale is dened will have
an impact on the appropriate level of kconstant. Rather than being prescriptive we therefore
emphasise that kconstant should be set on a case-by-case basis within the appropriate context.
4.6.1.2 The severity penalty
As noted earlier our severity weighting enters the GA of CG-kanon as a severity penalty. This
severity penalty function is used by a tness function during the optimisation process. The
tness function is dened and discussed in Section 4.7.
We call the severity weighting a severity penalty (SP) in the context of the tness function.
The GA seeks to minimise the total severity penalty as part of the optimisation process. The








• A tuple is written as d and d ∈ D(·)
• D(·) denotes a dataset of crime data. For instance, using notation introduced earlier
D(O) is our dataset of reported crime data
• e ∈ E and E denotes the set of equivalence classes
• |ed,n| is the size of the equivalence class that tuple d nds itself in during iteration n of
the GA
We see from Equation 4.5 that severe crimes in small equivalence classes will result in large
penalties and vice versa. If for example a report about a murder (with severity weighting of
25) is located in an equivalence class that satises 5-anonymity after generalisation, a penalty
of 25
5
= 5 is generated. If however an incident about theft is located in that same equivalence
class, this will only cause a severity penalty of 1.
The GA for CG-kanon is set up to minimise the total severity penalty across all tuples in the
dataset. Therefore if it can nd a replacement for the murder incident (say an incident of
drunken driving) which reduces the total severity penalty it might do so. For instance if the
drunken driving case was located in an equivalence class of size 25 we could move the murder
incident to this larger equivalence class if it can share the same QIDs. The drunken driving case
could be generalised to the 5-anonymity equivalence class if it can be assigned the appropriate











The above example simplies the GA approach for CG-kanon considerably since there are other
constraints such as information utility which the algorithm evaluates simultaneously. However
the example demonstrate how the severity penalty forces the GA to move severe crimes to
larger equivalence classes and vice versa.
We mentioned that the total severity penalty for the entire dataset is what the GA seeks to
minimise amongst other factors. Equation 4.5 dened the severity penalty for a single tuple.
The aggregate severity penalty for a dataset which the tness function targets is denoted by





The equation shows that the total severity penalty for a CG-kanon dataset is simply the sum-




Figure 4.4 provides a graphical representation of the CG-kanon GA. It is based on a selection of
components from Figure 3.2 and shows how the parameters for CG-kanon t into the broader
algorithm. The information loss table shown in the diagram is a lookup table for losses generated
using LMCG. We provide a UML diagram of the CG-kanon GA for the interested reader in
Appendix A.
4.6.1.3 Limitations of CG-kanon
The main drawback of CG-kanon is that diversity of the sensitive attribute in large equivalence
classes may be quite low depending on the distribution of tuples in the dataset. This becomes
apparent in Section 5.2.1.1 of our results.
The algorithm might also suppress a large proportion of tuples in an attempt to satisfy the
minimum kmin-anonymity for the entire dataset. To counter this within CG-kanon we limit
the size of the largest equivalence class by introducing an additional penalty into the tness
function if an equivalence class is larger than a specied limit. This forces the GA in CG-kanon
to reduce the size of the largest equivalence classes. Reducing the size of the largest equivalence
classes is a pragmatic approach to help improve diversity of the sensitive attribute for those
larger equivalence classes. We also found that this decreased the number of suppressions created
by the GA to satisfy the minimum kmin-anonymity.
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Nevertheless, limiting the size of the largest equivalence classes is an articial approach to com-
pensate for the well-know vulnerability of k-anonymity to inference attacks. This vulnerability
was accentuated by using the severity penalty as part of CG-kanon on our generated data. Our
CG-diverse approach therefore seeks to address this limitation by seeking to achieve l-diversity
directly rather than applying it as an extension to k-anonymity. The average severity metric
provided a means to automate the anonymisation process within the context of l-diversity.
4.6.2 Understanding CG-diverse
Throughout most of the literature l-diversity is considered as a further privacy extension to
k-anonymity. In this regard algorithms are often adapted from meeting k-anonymity to also
meet the stricter l-diversity denition. In a GA context, however, this approach would make
the tness function increasingly complex and as Section 5.2.3.3 of our results show this causes
ineciencies. Our approach for CG-diverse was therefore to use the notion of diversity as our
starting point and from this obtain a minimum level of k-anonymity which is also adhered to.
This is because an l-diverse dataset is also at least k-anonymous such that k is equal to l.
Whereas CG-kanon used the crime severity scale as a severity penalty for the GA , CG-diverse
uses the crime severity scale to calculate an average crime severity for the dataset and individual
equivalence classes during a two-step process.
4.6.2.1 Average severity
We distinguish between two average severity (AS) measures. One is calculated based on the
entire dataset and the other on a specic equivalence class. The next section will show how the
two denitions are used by CG-diverse.












Figure 4.5 shows these average severity measures as calculated for a given sample dataset. For
instance the ASe for equivalence class 2 is 5 (
5+3+7+7+7
5
). We also see from looking at the crime
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severity scale in Figure 4.3 that the AS for both Equation 4.7 and Equation 4.8 can range
between 3 and 25. We now look to see what this implies for our CG-diverse algorithm.
4.6.2.2 Diversity in two steps
The NP-hardness of achieving l-diversity for a given dataset requires us to consider a trade-
o between complete optimality for an l-diverse dataset and achieving results in a reasonable
time period. Implementing CG-diverse as a two-step process proved to provide satisfactory
results and addressed the vulnerability to inferential attacks of CG-kanon as our results show
in Chapter 5. The two steps are:
1. The ASD is calculated for the entire dataset. This ASD is used by the GA of CG-diverse
as an input parameter (again the loss metric from Section 4.4.3 is also an input as for
CG-kanon). The GA starts its optimisation and anonymises the dataset with a target
level of l-diversity such that l is equal to ASD. Therefore if ASD is higher (i.e. more
severe crimes are present in the dataset) the level of l-diversity targeted for the data as
a whole will also be higher. As noted earlier, however, given the severity weighting scale
in Figure 4.3 the level of l-diversity in our case will be restricted to the range between 3
and 25 depending on the underlying dataset.
The stochastic nature of a GA means that there is no guarantee that the level of ASD-
diversity will be achieved during the allocated runtime. Therefore since we operate within
a time constrained environment we will need to interrupt the optimisation process after
a specied amount of time as Section 4.7.1 will discuss.
We could at this point suppress all equivalence classes that do not meet the required
level of ASD-diversity. However this would result in signicant information loss. There
may be a large number of equivalence classes where the constituent tuples contain only
less severe crimes. Requiring those equivalence classes to meet the same global level of
ASD-diversity may be overly restrictive. We can see this by considering some sample
results in Figure 4.5. In this specic case we had ASD equal to 11 for the entire dataset.
Equivalence class (EC) 4 satises the requirements set by our rst step (i.e. diversity is
greater than or equal to ASD). However all other ECs would have to be suppressed on
this basis.
Looking at EC 1 we see that it is 6-diverse and 7-anonymous. The crimes in EC 1 are also
in general not too severe with Robbery as the most severe crime with severity 7. Step 2
of CG-diverse is designed to identify such ECs with lower average severity (but adequate
relative diversity) and avoid them being suppressed. This is done by using ASe.
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Figure 4.5: Average severity versus diversity
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2. During step 1 our GA for CG-diverse generated an anonymised dataset optimised for data
utility whilst constructing equivalence classes that meet ASD-diversity. The anonymised
dataset after step 1 provides us with an optimal result given metrics for information loss
and the time we allocated for it to complete.
Step 2 seeks to exploit the optimisation further by assessing the privacy of individual
equivalences classes not meeting the global ASD-diversity requirement. Here ASe from
Equation 4.8 is used to compare the level of diversity for an equivalence class to its
specic average severity. If the average severity of an equivalence class exceeds the level
of diversity in that equivalence class, these tuples are generalised to the highest level.
EC 2 in Figure 4.5 is an example of where this would occur. Alternatively tuples where
diversity exceeds ASe are published as is (EC 1, 3, 5 and 6). EC 4 was already validated
during step 1 as it satised ASD-diversity.
Note that during the rst step we used a global severity measure for all equivalence classes
but in this step we reassess whether equivalences classes not meeting the global severity
of ASD should in fact be suppressed based on their local individual characteristics as
dened by ASe.
Lastly, we note that this second step is computationally inexpensive as it simply requires
us to compare ASe with the actual observed diversity of the equivalence class. Since both
these quantities are calculated during the optimisation in step 1, processing for step 2
takes a few milliseconds.
Figure 4.6: CG-diverse
We see from Figure 4.6 that CG-diverse uses the same CG loss metric as CG-kanon. Also
whilst CG-kanon has three main inputs (kmin,SPD and LMCG) for the GA, CG-diverse only
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has two inputs, namely ASD and LMCG. ASe is not an input to the GA itself since it is used
post optimisation. The fact that CG-diverse has fewer inputs and therefore a simpler tness
function increases optimisation eciency as we will show in our results.
4.7 Fitness function
The tness function is used during each iteration to evaluate how well the proposed solution
meets the desired outcomes. The "tness" of each individual is measured against an objective or
a set of objectives as in our case. The tness function in our case evaluates multiple objectives










The above denitions show that the tness of an individual is inversely related to the infor-
mation loss and the respective severity measures for CG-kanon and CG-diverse. Our tness
function is located in the CGEvaluator as shown earlier in Figure 3.2. Specifying the tness
function may be an iterative process and in Section 5.1 we discuss some of the challenges ex-
perienced in this regard. Whilst SPtot,n,ASD,n and LMCG,n are the main drivers of the tness
functions we should point out that within our constrained environment additional parameters
were introduced as covered in Section 5.1 of our results to make the implementation practical.
4.7.1 Stopping criteria for CG
Our literature review covered stopping criteria relevant to our implementation. The rst section
of Chapter 5 of our results covers pilot studies that we used to understand how best to implement
our GA for CG given our resource constrained environment.
It became evident from observing the convergence of parameters in the tness function that the
appropriate factor for terminating the optimisation is time (i.e. runtime of the algorithm). By
using a Pareto optimal GA approach we are unable to provide any guarantees about when the
specied level of kmin and ASD would be satised (for CG-kanon and CG-diverse respectively)
by all equivalence classes. Third parties using the data also cannot wait for extended time
periods to extract data.
We therefore adopted a pragmatic approach based on our experimental results. We introduced
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a sampling scheme to reduce the computational complexity of each run. By looking at the
optimisation eciency of CG-kanon and CG-diverse we observed that a sample size of 1000
crime reports provided useful results in 30 minutes. A more detailed discussion of our sampling
scheme follows in the next section.
4.7.2 CG sampling scheme
Our motivation for implementing a sampling scheme is two-fold, namely:
1. To reduce computational complexity of the GA and thereby achieve optimal results within
a shorter time-frame
2. The attribute weighting scheme introduced for the CG loss metric introduces additional
disclosure risks which could be addressed by an appropriate sampling scheme
The rationale behind our rst point is self explanatory. We therefore discuss the second point
in more detail.
4.7.2.1 Implications of introducing exibility through LMCG
A loss metric which gives third parties exibility to weight the QIDs brings with it some
complications. Most notably it increases disclosure risk as a user might iteratively overweight
and underweight QIDs to obtain dierent sets of anonymised data. These datasets could then be
combined to achieve a disclosure. Consider the scenario where a third party analyst draws three
anonymised samples of 1000 records. For each sample 1, 2 and 3 he recursively overweights Age,
Suburb and ReporterType respectively. For sample 1, 2 and 3 this gives much more granular
information for Age, Suburb and Reportertype respectively. If sample sizes of 1000 records
are drawn randomly the probability of disclosure increases signicantly if he repeats the above
process. This increased disclosure risk holds even where an attribute weighting scheme is not
introduced since the anonymisation for each record is not unique within dierent samples.
One approach to overcome this problem is to use sampling without replacement. This may
seem overly restrictive, however, as the database grows and larger samples can be drawn a
more representative view of the data is obtainable through a sampling approach if this is done
randomly. Whilst a sampling approach addresses the disclosure concern raised above, it also
solves two further problems related to our GA implementation:
• Computational complexity. A smaller dataset makes a GA much faster and more
feasible for practical consideration in our resource constrained environment
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• New crime reports. New data can be combined with existing data from where sam-
ples are being drawn. This makes most recent crime reports available for selection and
facilitates growth in the volume of anonymised data available to third parties. As covered
in Chapter 2 sequential releases bring with it some complications. However sampling
without replacement circumvents most of these issues albeit in a rather crude manner
There are some drawbacks of the above sampling scheme and these include:
• Third parties are restricted in the number of samples they can draw
• In cases where a third party has depleted the number of samples he can draw, new crime
reports are not immediately available to be released as part of the dataset. The third
party will be required to wait until adequate new reports have entered the database to
create a new sample for release
• The impact of the point above is that time selection is introduced where later samples
are drawn by a user
• The system needs to keep track of records already released to a third party and remove
these from those records available to that party in subsequent draws
• The risk of disclosure from collaboration between third parties is increased. However this
should be controlled by condentiality agreements and terms-of-use contracts as a default
precaution
Our results in Chapter 5 give further insights into the attribute weighting scheme and the above
sampling scheme.
4.8 Countering biases
Before proceeding with this section it is important to point out that whilst our work identi-
es the notion of biases in the MCRF we were unable to fully consider the issue during our
implementation. We do provide possible approaches of dealing with it by incorporating an ad-
justment factor. We also conducted preliminary experiments in isolation to the rest of the CG
implementation to gauge the validity of our proposed adjustment factor and we comment on
these experiments in Chapter 5. However the scope of our work pertaining to the adjustment
factor for biases are not as extensive as our focus on CG-kanon and CG-diverse for instance.
This could therefore be an interesting area of future research.
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4.8.1 The adjustment factor
The notion of an adjustment factor aims to compensate for possible biases introduced through
the MCRF. We previously dened a bias as an instance where the reported frequency distri-
bution of crime reports diers from the true frequency distribution. Section 4.1.2 pointed out
various biases (distortions) that may be introduced into the crime data through a MCRF -
these biases are what we seek to minimise through an adjustment factor.
The validity of our idea is rstly premised on the notion that we are able to determine the true
distribution of crimes. Secondly we are assuming that third parties are interested in the true
underlying crime statistics and not only in crime data gathered from the MCRF.
In practice we may take the true underlying distribution of oences to be historical data gath-
ered by the law enforcement agency over several years. Admittedly, in the context of a de-
veloping country it may be less likely that such data is accurate or even exists. Furthermore,
the true distribution needs to be reective of the area covered by the MCRF. Nevertheless for
our purposes we suppose that we can specify a true distribution to serve as a benchmark for
assessing biases in reported data. We might also consider adapting our true distribution over
time to incorporate the reported data and adjust our conditional probabilities in a Bayesian
manner.
Whilst our crime severity scale was used in CG-kanon and CG-diverse to increase privacy for
more serious crimes, the adjustment factor favours generalisation of tuples that are likely to be
biased. Intuitively less information is lost with respect to the true distribution of oences when
distorted data are generalised.
We turn to methods used for statistical hypothesis testing to assess whether the reported
frequency of oences deviate from those of the true distribution. The χ2 goodness of t test
serves as a possible candidate to formalise this notion.
4.8.2 The χ2 test
We introduce the following notation related to the number of actual crime reports and those
derived from the true population:
• Tc is dened as the true number of oences in category c where c = 1, 2...n ∈ N
• T represents the total true number of oences across all categories
Notation for frequency counts can now be stated using the notation above:
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• f obsc =
Oc
O
is the reported frequency count for oence in category c
• f truec =
Tc
T
is the true frequency count for oence in category c
• Ec is the expected number of reported oences for category c based on the true distribu-
tion. This is dened as Ec = f
true
c ×O
Denition 4.8.1 (χ2 distribution). The summation of Z2c where c = 1, 2...c ∈ C have a χ2
distribution with n degrees of freedom if and only if Zc, c = 1, 2...c ∈ C are identically and





n, where Zc v N(0, 1) (4.11)
The result above is most often applied to assess goodness-of-t across a number of categories
C simultaneously. Using our notation above we could test whether a signicant dierence (in
a statistical sense) exists between the true and reported frequencies of crime reports. Such a
goodness-of-t test is dened next using our notation above.
Denition 4.8.2 (χ2 goodness-of-t test). From the statistical literature on hypothesis testing





The summation across all crime categories then gives us a χ2 random variable according to






However, more than being able to determine whether the observed and true distributions are
alike, we want a metric to incorporate into the tness function of a GA which will compensate
for specic biases. The test statistic in its current from Equation 4.13 is not suited for this
purpose as it can only tell us whether two distributions are similar. Therefore whilst the χ2
test is widely accepted as a sound metric for determining goodness-of-t it does not provide
the desired result for our GA in its current form. We may however think to adapt it slightly.
This is done in the following section where we propose a denition for the adjustment factor.
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4.8.3 Dening the adjustment factor
We stated above that within the context of a GA the test statistic from a χ2 test is not suitable.
However if we consider the contribution of each individual crime category to the overall test
statistic, namely zc, as our adjustment factor we may have a suitable answer. We consider an
example to demonstrate this.
Figure 4.7(a) compares the distribution of crime reports used for CG (observed) with an as-
sumed true distribution of crimes. The table in Figure 4.8.3 shows how we calculated the
adjustment factor for each crime category as adjc =
√
zc. These results show that adjc was
higher where dierences between the observed and expected frequencies were most pronounced,
namely Murder, Burglary, Robbery and Theft. This result can also be conrmed by considering
the numerator of Equation 4.12.
During earlier sections of our implementation we showed how dierent parameters enter the
tness function of the GA as penalty functions. We can now see how the adjc factors can
similarly enter the tness function to be incorporated into the optimisation process.
(a) True distribution
(b) Deriving adjustment factors
Figure 4.7: Adjustment factors
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Whilst the derivation for the adjustment factor might seem unnecessarily complicated, we
prefer proposing a metric with some statistical grounding for theoretical soundness. Further
research might suggest that much simpler heuristic measures to counter biases work equally
well. Nevertheless our approach provides a starting point for such discussions.
Whilst we introduce the notion of an adjustment factor in some detail we reiterate that our
experimental results are comparatively more limited. We will briey discuss our ndings from
such experiments in Chapter 5.
4.9 Anonymisation algorithms
Figure 3.2 gave a broad overview of the anonymisation engine. Now equipped with a well-dened
tness function we set out the algorithms used for optimisation. Some additional terminology
specic to GAs might be useful at this stage before looking at the algorithms in detail.
Some GA terminology:
• Gene. In our context a gene is equivalent to the QID and the corresponding crime for a
single tuple
• Genotype. Traditionally a chromosome denes an individual in the context of GAs. The
Opt4J framework refers to the chromosome as the genotype. A genotype in CrimeGenes
will be the collection of all genes (i.e. all tuples consisting of a QID and the corresponding
sensitive attribute)
• Adults. These are individuals which are allowed to reproduce ospring. In our work each
individual consists of an entirely generalised data sample which has been anonymised
• Ospring. Adults produce ospring using cross-over operations dened below. Ospring
constitute data generalisations in subsequent iterations of the algorithm which have been
derived by keeping desirable properties of their parent data generalisations
• Tournament. A number of multi-objective algorithms use tournaments to improve se-
lection of dominant individuals. The SPEA2 algorithm in our implementation also uses
tournament selection. Here a number of individuals are selected to compete for superi-
ority. They are ranked according to tness and only a selection of the ttest individuals
are allowed to generate ospring
• Cross-over. This is a GA operator which denes how much genetic material from each
adult is taken to produce ospring. The cross-over operator is often distinguished from
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mutation which is an operator that introduces random variation into the genetic material
• Population. The maximum number of individuals (adults plus ospring) allowed during
an iteration.
We comment on how these concepts are implemented in the CrimeGenes GA when we specify
the algorithms below.
4.9.1 Anonymisation algorithms
In this section we break down the GAs of CG-kanon and CG-diverse into four main algorithms.
Before looking at the ner details it may be helpful to consider the context of each algorithm
within the broader framework of our CG implementation. Figure 4.8 graphically shows how
each algorithm discussed in this section relates to one another and the broader framework as
well. A similar diagram was given in Chapter 3 where the design of CG was given.
Figure 4.8: Relationship between algorithms
We now look at specics of each of the four algorithms.
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4.9.1.1 Algorithm 1 (Gene creator)
Algorithm 1 is called once at the start of each optimisation run. It generates the gene pool
available for creation of the genotype. In our setting a gene is created by combining one per-
mitted generalisation for a tuple with the reported crime. For example, if an incident involving
theft was reported by a victim aged 20, living in Newlands an acceptable gene for this report
would be "20#Southern Suburbs#Reporter#Theft". There are clearly a number of combina-
tions across the three attribute taxonomies. The purpose of the GeneCreator is to search for
all these possible permutations and make them available for use in the GenotypeCreator in
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 requires the following inputs: CrimeData, ageHierarchy, addressHierarchy, re-
porterHierarchy. Each of these are generated from the database using SQL queries and provided




Purpose: Creates the gene pool of possible tuple generalisations
Requires: CrimeData;ageHierarchy;addressHierarchy;reporterHierarchy
1: crimeKeys← HashMap < empty >
2: crimeCount← HashMap < empty >
3: availableGeneralisations← HashMap < empty >
4: for report in CrimeData do
5: reportKey ← report(age)#report(address)#report(reporter)#report(crime)
6: if reportKey not in crimeKeys.keys() then
7: Add reportKey to crimeKeys
8: Add report(id) to crimeKeys[reportKey]
9: crimeCount← 1
10: else
11: Add report(id) to crimeKeys[reportKey]




16: availableReporter ← ageHierarchy(reportKey)
17: possibleGeneralisations← ArrayList
18: for age in availableAges do
19: for address in availableAddress do
20: for reporter in availableReporter do
21: tempGeneralisation← age#address#reporter#report(crime)








4.9.1.2 Algorithm 2 (Genotype)
Algorithm 2 GenotypeCreator
Purpose: Create the genotype for an individual
Requires: GeneCreator,SelectMapGenotype,CompositeGenotype
1: genePool← ArrayList . of type SelectMapGenotype
2: mappedGenePool← ArrayList . of type SelectMapGenotype
3: genotype← AnonGenotype . implements CompositeGenotype
4: for key in crimeKeys do
5: Add crimeKeys(key),availableGeneralisations(key) to genePool
6: end for
7: for entry in genePool do
8: entry.init(random) . init() randomly maps report ID to equivalence class
9: Add entry to mappedGenePool
10: end for
11: genotype← mappedGenePool . Creates a Genotype of type CompositeGenotype
Algorithm 2 constructs one genotype from the gene pool created in Algorithm 1. It is required
that each genotype is created randomly to induce sucient randomness in the starting popu-
lation for the entire search space to be adequately explored by the GA. In our implementation
the genotype is equivalent to an individual and the genotype can enter the evaluation phase
as is. The Opt4J framework in [37] does, however, provide an intermediate decoding module
that transforms a genotype into something interpretable in the evaluation module. An example
where this may be required is where the genes are binary representations of an object. The
decoder module would then transform such binary representations into an object whose features
can be evaluated against the tness function. We did explore the possibility of representing the
genes in Algorithm 1 as binary strings in an attempt to reduce memory overhead, however we
did not nd a noticeable reduction in computation eciency. In our implementation therefore
the genotype is already in a usable form for the evaluation module and the decoder simply
creates a copy of the genotype.
4.9.1.3 Algorithm 3 and 4 (CG-kanon and CG-diverse)
With Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 dened we are now in a position to set out the full GAs
for CG-kanon in Algorithm 3 and CG-diverse in Algorithm 4 responsible for the anonymisation
process. The required userInput in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 refers to the anonymisation
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weighting for attributes provided by the third party through the user interface when requesting
anonymised data.
Algorithm 3 CG-kanon
Purpose: Create the CG-kanon genotype for an individual
Requires: GeneCreator,GenotypeCreator, userInput
1: anonymisedData← ArrayList
2: runT ime← t . optimisation runtime set in seconds
3: populationSize← size . population size for GA is pre-dened
4: GeneCreator
5: for i ≤ populationSize do
6: GenotypeCreator
7: end for
8: while time < runT ime do . starts the evaluator
9: function Fitness function(Genotypes)
10: Evaluate: loss metric
11: Evaluate: severity penalty
12: Evaluate: k-value
13: end function
14: function Crossover(Genotypes, Fitness)
15: Crossover




20: Email anonymised data to user
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Algorithm 4 CG-diverse
Purpose: Create the CG-diverse genotype for an individual
Requires: GeneCreator,GenotypeCreator, userInput
1: anonymisedData← ArrayList
2: ecDiversity ← HashMap
3: runT ime← t . optimisation runtime set in seconds
4: populationSize← size . population size for GA is pre-dened
5: GeneCreator
6: for i ≤ populationSize do
7: GenotypeCreator
8: end for
9: calculate ASD . Average severity for data to be anonymised
10: while time < runT ime do . STEP1:starts the evaluator with global average severity
11: function Fitness function(Genotypes)
12: Evaluate: loss metric
13: Evaluate: diversity
14: end function
15: function Crossover(Genotypes, Fitness)
16: Crossover
17: Run tournament . Apply SPEA2 selector
18: end function
19: Update population
20: Update: ecDiversity . Record the diversity of each equivalence class
21: end while
22: for e ∈ E do . STEP2: Iterate through equivalence classes for local severity
23: calculate ASECe
24: if ASECe ≤ ecDiversity(e) then
25: Generalise QIDs to highest level
26: end if
27: end for
28: Email anonymised data to user
4.10 Evaluation of CrimeGenes
Our evaluation of the CrimeGenes implementation is informed by our discussion in Section 2.4 of
the literature review. In particular rather than using one specic measure to monitor anonymi-
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sation we look at the results from dierent perspectives. This is in line with the notion that
third parties will also not restrict their analysis to one particular metric. Our evaluation can
be grouped under the following headings:
4.10.1 Qualitative assessment
We assess the quality of an anonymisation from a privacy perspective by looking at the distri-
bution of the sensitive attribute after applying the CG-kanon and CG-diverse algorithms. We
also consider the granularity of generalised QIDs to determine whether the attribute weighting
scheme performs as expected. Our approach here is similar to that of the Cornell Anonymisa-
tion Tool-kit2 whereby we prefer inspection of the statistical properties of the anonymisation.
This often provides valuable insights into the privacy risks related to the anonymised data
which may be overlooked by only looking at a summary statistic.
4.10.2 Quantitative
Our quantitative analysis of the results is more in line with mainstream literature. We look
at the information loss produced by both CG-kanon and CG-diverse based on the CrimeGenes
loss metric (LMCG). Our analysis of the loss metric is also utilised to compare the optimisation
eciency of CG-kanon relative to CG-diverse.
Classication accuracy is measured on a variety of datasets after applying dierent anonymisa-
tion algorithms. The UTD3 anonymisation toolbox was used to generate anonymised data from
the Datay and Mondrian algorithms for comparison with CrimeGenes. The Weka software
framework was then employed to perform classication tests on all anonymised data using a
Naive Bayes classier. A 10-fold cross-validation test was conducted for classication accuracy.
Since our focus for CrimeGenes was not aimed specically at generating anonymised data for
classication we also analysed our results using the Kullman-Leibler divergence. A script was
written in Python to test anonymised datasets using this metric as this provides a standardised
measure of how dierent the distribution of the anonymised data are from the distribution of
the original data. The KL-divergence assumes that the crime reports follow some multivariate
distribution. The original data is taken to be this distribution. The anonymised data is
then seen as an empirical distribution taken from that distribution. The KL-value measures
the "closeness" of this empirical distribution to the original distribution. However since our





point values (e.g. 18) we need to make an assumption about the distribution of point values
within those ranges to apply the KL-measure. We assumed a uniform distribution for such









• −→xn is the vector of QIDs for tuple n
• f ′(·) is the empirical distribution obtained from the anonymised data, such that f ′(−→xn) =
1
N
× |e| × Pr[−→xn|E = e]
• E is the set of equivalence classes
4.11 Discussion
It is evident from our implementation that the crime severity scale is the crucial component
to ensuring automation for both CG-kanon and CG-diverse. The GAs in CG-kanon and CG-
diverse implement two dierent input parameters (SP· and AS· respectively) derived from this
crime severity scale.
It is important to reiterate that the GAs of CG-kanon and CG-diverse handle all aspects of
the anonymisation and optimisation process once it receives the required input parameters and
starts running. This is because the framework of a GA enables us to specify desirable properties
of the output by using the tness function. The operators of a GA (cross-over, mutation and
tournament selection for example) then allows it to search for the closest match.
It should be noted that a GA is not necessarily required to achieve automation. The crime
severity scale can be used as an input to a Datay algorithm for instance to achieve k-anonymity.
The average severity could be used to generate an ASD-diverse dataset as well. However such
implementations do not take information utility and therefore optimality into account. The
GA approach enables us to combine all aspects into a single process which:
• Produces optimal results with respect to the privacy requirements (k-anonymity for CG-
kanon and l-diversity for CG-diverse) and information loss as specied by LMCG




• Facilitates our attribute weighting scheme to provide exibility from a third party's per-
spective in specifying the granularity of the QIDs
Our observation about possible biases introduced into the data by the MCRF proved to be an
interesting aspect of our work. We did nd, however, that adding yet another parameter into
the tness function of our GAs to counter possible biases degraded the quality of our optimi-
sations. Therefore whilst we considered possible measures to identify and correct for biases the
practicalities for GAs may need some further work. For completeness we included an alternative
measure for the adjustment factor which we derived. This is shown in Appendix B. However
pilot experiments proved that our earlier denition for the adjustment factor in Section 4.8 was
more eective to compensate for biases in our GAs.





This section presents our experimental ndings in support of earlier discussions from Section 3
and Section 4. We demonstrate the feasibility of our automated anonymisation scheme for crime
data using a genetic algorithm given our resource constrained environment within a developing
country. The three constraints faced relate to human capital (data anonymisation expertise)
within the law enforcement agency, computational capacity and time constraints.
We have divided our results into two parts. Section 5.1 covers points relevant to our experi-
mental process. Genetic algorithms can and have been applied to a broad range of problems.
To harness the potential of GAs for practical purposes often requires an iterative approach to
construct suitable implementations. This can possibly be seen as the downside of the exibility
provided by a GA. Our tests undertaken to nd a suitable implementation are therefore quite
informative to understand our nal implementation and results. Section 5.2 evaluates these




Hardware specication of the host server was as follows: Ubuntu server 12.04 operating system
running on a 64bit machine with 8GB RAM. Processor speed of 3.2GHz (Intel Xeon E3-1230
Quad Core). Java 1.7.0_65 was installed to run the GA and Python 2.7.3 was used to run
the Flask-based web server. PostgreSQL 9.1 was selected as our database management system.
Postx was installed as our email server. The entire implementation was run on a rented
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dedicated server with a static IP to facilitate the web application.
5.1.2 Preliminary work
Solving the anonymisation problem with a GA brought with it the following considerations and
challenges:
• A core GA framework would need to be selected as the complexities of building our own
is beyond the scope of this paper
• The multi-objective nature of the anonymisation problem needs to be catered for by the
above framework
• The computational complexities of GAs require signicantly more time to test and ob-
tain results. Anonymisation time for traditional implementations of k-anonymisation
algorithms such as Datay, Mondrian and Incognito can be measured in milliseconds for
moderate sized datasets. The equivalent can take several minutes or even hours for larger
datasets using GAs
• GA optimisation caters for exible problem specication, however with this come di-
culties in determining appropriate inputs and parameters
5.1.2.1 An appropriate framework
The requirements for a suitable framework were summarised as follows:
• It needs to be cross-platform to facilitate adoption across various law enforcement agencies
and/or departments
• The framework and programming language implementation had to support the multi-
objective nature of our anonymisation problem
• A modular framework is preferred as this ensures exibility to structure our implementa-
tion and provides scope for modications going forward if required
• A well documented framework is critical due to the inherent complexities of GAs
Given the above requirements the Opt4j framework1 of [37] was chosen for the GA component
of our implementation. The framework is written in Java. This facilitates cross-platform imple-




for multi-objective optimisation problems such as ours. Evolutionary algorithms (EA), as a sub-
set of GAs, have been widely applied to multi-dimensional problems. An appropriate selector is
however required for multi-objective EAs. Opt4j included a range of selector implementations
including two of the most popular namely, SPEA2 and NSGA2.
The modular nature of the framework is evident from Figure 3.2 where Opt4j is at the core
of the CG anonymisation algorithm. The modularity is made accessible by well documented
source code and informative tutorials on how to combine various components. According to
the authors 51% of the source code are comments. Two other Java frameworks for GAs which
might be explored by interested readers are the Watchmaker framework2 and EvA23.
5.1.2.2 Formulating a practical implementation
Computational and time complexities associated with GAs meant that various aspects had to
be considered before implementation. This was to ensure that our nal solutions are practical
and can provide satisfactory results given our problem setting. We look at salient points related
to this in the discussion to follow.
• Record size. Our generated dataset consisted of 10000 records. We selected much
smaller samples from this set to monitor computation times. A simple tness function
was specied which simply required 5-anonymity. No loss metrics or penalty functions
were included at this stage. The algorithm stopped once all equivalence classes met 5-
anonymity. Note that this is dierent from our nal implementation and served only as
a baseline to monitor the impact of record size on a GA. We can see from Figure 5.1
that rstly most of the benet is derived early on and secondly that the marginal benet
decreases over time. This agrees with ndings in other works employing GAs.
A subsequent run was conducted on the full dataset of 10000 records where the tness
function for CG-kanon was used. A logging module outputted the progress of the GA
after each iteration - this optimisation log was monitored. The process was stopped after 5
hours where roughly 200 equivalence classes still did not meet the CG-kanon requirement.
Although progress had been made by the algorithm this was clearly too slow given our
problem setting.
The points to follow discuss measures used to address this runtime issue. We show that
with some minor adjustments to our implementation we can reduce computation time





Figure 5.1: Impact of record size on computation time
• Sampling. As a rst step we reduced the number of records processed for anonymisation
- we used the idea of sampling 1000 records at a time for each data request. As noted
in our literature review the sampling of records however introduces new challenges. In
our particular case, the QID weight selection from Section 4.4.3 created additional dis-
closure risks since users of the data are given more exibility to specify features of the
data. We selected sampling without replacement as a simple solution to this problem in
Section 4.7.2.1.
• Pre-processing. We refer to pre-processing as modifying the genotypes of the GA before
starting the optimisation process. As described in Section 3 the genotype denes the
building blocks accessible to the GA for constructing a solution. We considered selectively
generating genotypes which more closely match our main priority during anonymisation.
More specically we forced genotypes to meet the k-anonymous requirement for CG-kanon
before entering as candidates into the starting population. This was done by generalising
attributes to the highest node for equivalence classes that do not meet the k-anonymity
requirement.
Figure 5.1.2.2 shows our experimental output for CG-kanon which was run for 15 minutes.
Figure 5.2(b) and Figure 5.2(c) show that we obtain a signicant initial benet for equiv-
alence classes not meeting k and the severity penalty respectively through pre-processing.
The reduction in the severity penalty is derived from larger equivalence classes produced
when pre-processing for k-anonymity.
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(a) Loss metric (b) Equivalence classes not meeting K
(c) Severity penalty
Figure 5.2: Impact of pre-processing on anonymisation metrics
However, the benet for these two parameters is soon eroded after only a few minutes
due to the exponential improvement shortly after optimisation. The stickiness of the
loss metric in Figure 5.2(a) is now of greater concern. This implies that we have over-
generalised signicantly when the genotype is constrained. Another interpretation of this
result is shown by Figure 5.3.
We see that Figure 5.3 conrms the over-generalisation. Firstly we note that pre-processing
resulted in anonymised records distributed over only 18 equivalence classes4. Non-constrained
genotypes created 111 equivalence classes (after the 15 equivalence classes not meeting
kmin were generalised to the highest node, i.e. rolled into G18
∗).
The above results informed our decision that the information loss of fully generalising a
small number of equivalence classes after a pre-determined runtime outweighs the cost of
over-generalisation due to pre-processing. Pre-processing does however enforce a stricter
privacy throughout the optimisation process and might be considered where we want to
enable the user to interrupt the optimisation at any stage and retrieve the data as is.
An improved pre-processing module might also be considered to retain more information
during this stage. Applying a modied Datay algorithm for instance to enforce the k-




Figure 5.3: Impact of pre-processing on equivalence classes
anonymity prior to entering the GA might be a solution. However the modied Datay
algorithm should generate suciently random generalisations to qualify as input for a
GA. Furthermore, since CrimeGenes uses a local recoding model to improve information
retention this would somehow need to be accounted for in the pre-processing as Datay
is based on a global recoding model.
Currently the proposed pre-processing over generalises by removing too much detail and
requires signicant processing time to recover from that. Our results showed that suppres-
sion after anonymisation is much more eective and the desired loss metrics and severity
penalties can be optimised more successfully.
• Restricting the search space. The ability of EAs to solve multi-dimensional problems
is derived from the fact that the entire solution space is eectively explored by the al-
gorithm. As alluded to however in one of our earlier points this can result in signicant
computation times because irrelevant or impractical solutions are explored.
Restricting the search space can be achieved rstly through redening the range of ac-
ceptable variables before optimisation or secondly by guiding the optimisation process
itself. In our setting the sample data consists of two QIDs with highly granular generali-
sation hierarchies, namely Age and Suburb. This increases the search space and therefore
computational complexity. We could consider pruning generalisation hierarchies to re-
duce computational complexity if other eciency measures as discussed in this section
fail. However, as mentioned in Section 4.1.1 using granular generalisations can be viewed
as a worst-case scenario for testing our implementation. In short, proving the validity of
results for sub-optimal data is preferred to using data suited to the specic implemen-
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tation. We therefore did not change the generalisation hierarchy but instead looked to
target the optimisation process itself.
For CG-kanon in particular, we sought to guide the EA in its search for optimal solutions
by inducing a penalty to the tness function if:
1. It explored solutions resulting in large numbers of equivalence classes not meeting
the level of k-anonymity
2. It created equivalence classes larger than 10% of the total records in the sample
Note that for neither of these we stated a specic level or constraint, we simply guided
the process to remain bounded to a location in the search space we view as desirable. As
an example observe in Figure 5.2(b) how the dotted line is allowed to deviate briey from
zero but promptly returns to the x-axis. This same technique assists in rapidly improving
the unconstrained genotype in the same gure.
• Algorithm inputs. In addition to setting parameters for the tness function we need
to set the population size, number of iterations , the number of ospring and cross-over
rates for the GA as a whole.
One complication when using a Pittsburgh approach is that each individual on its own
comprises a solution to the problem. This increases demand for memory as mentioned
in Chapter 2 during our review of the literature. Population sizes exceeding 200 caused
the Java Garbage Collector (GC) to throw an error as the memory limit was reached.
We experimented by manually expanding the memory allocated to the GA process. Al-
though increased memory allocation was a possible solution we settled on decreasing the
population size to 100 instead. After sucient experimentation we set the above input
parameters as follows:
 Starting population at 100
 Number of ospring at 100
 Cross-over rate was set at the default Opt4J level of 0.95
 Number of iterations were set at 1000000. However note that this would never be
reached as our stopping criteria (discussed next) would terminate the GA well in
advance. This parameter was therefore set suciently large as to never be reached
• Stopping criterion. We discussed relevant stopping criterion for GAs in our literature
review. Due to the open-ended nature of the optimisation process for GAs it remains
dicult to determine in advance when the optimisation will complete. From a practical
perspective, however, users will require some guarantees in this regard. Results from our
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preliminary tests demonstrate that improvement of results are exponential shortly after
initialisation but fairly constant after large number of iterations. We therefore looked for
a compromised approach which exploits the exponential improvement early on and gives
users a result within a reasonable amount of time.
Our experiments in this regard revealed that after 30 minutes between 3% and 6% of
tuples were not in equivalence classes meeting the minimum level of k for CG-kanon.
This was weighed against running the algorithm for much longer than 30 minutes to
ensure full compliance with the level of k. Since 3% to 6% is relatively small we opted to
stop the algorithm after 30 minutes and generalise such outstanding tuples to the highest
level. We note the following two points in relation to this:
1. Figure 5.3 shows that with pre-processing the number of tuples suppressed was as
high as 35%. Therefore although the pre-processing resulted in termination of the
algorithm without requiring us to set a limit on runtime, the information loss of
suppressing such a large percentage of tuples was deemed too signicant. A more
ecient pre-processing algorithm might enable us to reconsider this approach if a
limit on runtime is considered undesirable
2. Tuples in equivalence classes not meeting the level of k-anonymity will typically relate
to less severe crimes due to the crime severity penalty of CrimeGenes. Generalising
such tuples to the highest level will help alleviate the inferential attack described
earlier where large equivalence classes have too little diversity.
Our discussion in this section has hopefully provided the reader with a useful background
when evaluating our actual results. We now turn to these results which incorporate the issues
highlighted above.
5.2 Experimental evaluation
As outlined in the previous section our nal implementation was informed by extensive exper-
imentation. Our results and interpretations thereof follow below. We begin this section by
qualitatively assessing the anonymised data produced by the CG-kanon model and the CG-
diverse model introduced in Chapter 4. We then consider the information loss generated by
these two models before looking at the classication accuracy and KL-divergences of the two
approaches. Our results also show the impact of introducing our QIDs weighting scheme and
we comment on this as appropriate.
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Throughout the results we will refer to an anonymisation based on the weightings of the QIDs
used during the anonymisation. This will be denoted as AwAge : SwSuburb : RwReporter. For
example where equal weights were assigned to the QIDs this will be denoted as an A1:S1:R1
anonymisation; similarly where we use A10:S5:R1 weights of 10, 5, and 1 were used for the
Age, Suburb and the Reporter attributes respectively.
kconstant was set to 5 for all results on CG-kanon anonymisations. Our minimum crime severity
level for the data was 3. Looking at our denition for kmin we see that this implies kmin is equal
to 5. For CG-diverse our lowest level achieved for diversity was 3 across all anonymisation
runs. Since on average the lower severity crimes were located in such equivalence classes this
was acceptable. We will discuss this again below.
All algorithms were allowed to run for 30 minutes after which the algorithm was stopped. Once
stopped the anonymised data was checked for compliance with the desired level of privacy.
Tuples not satisfying the privacy criteria on termination were processed further according to
the respective CG-kanon or CG-diverse algorithms in Section 4.9.
5.2.1 Qualitative assessment
In this section we look in particular at the distributions of the anonymised data provided by
both CG-kanon and CG-diverse to determine whether our GA has in fact anonymised the data
as expected.
Figure 5.4 shows an extract from an anonymised dataset using CG-kanon. Whilst the privacy
denitions vary between the two approaches, we note the following points which are common
to both when looking at the sample:
• A local recoding result is achieved which means that tuples with the same QIDs can be
generalised dierently across the entire dataset. A sample dataset in Figure 2.2 showed
how this can improve data utility
• The reported crime is not suppressed even where all other QIDs are suppressed. Although
this adds further utility to the anonymised data (third parties can derive the empirical
distribution for reported crimes) it makes the anonymised data for susceptible to inference
attacks
We now turn to analysing the distribution of the sensitive attribute after applying CG-kanon
and CG-diverse. Analysing this distribution gives us insight into how well privacy risk is
addressed by the algorithms. Information loss and utility metrics later deal with the opposing
question about data utility.
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Figure 5.4: Sample anonymisation
5.2.1.1 CG-kanon
The size of an equivalence class is the only privacy tool at our disposal within a k-anonymous
model. Our results show the impact of moving more severe crimes to larger equivalence classes
using the CG-kanon algorithm. Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of crime reports with dif-
ferent severities after applying CG-kanon with a A1:S1:R1 weighting. We see in Figure 5.5(a)
that without the CG-kanon severity penalty the three types of crimes reported are clustered
around smaller sized equivalence classes. Where the severity penalty is applied however we
see in Figure 5.5(b) that more severe crimes (Robbery and Murder in this case) are located in
larger equivalence classes. In general the crime reports are also more spread out across equiva-
lence classes. Whilst the algorithm performs as expected this introduces unwanted inferential
disclosure.
(a) No severity weighting (b) CG-kanon
Figure 5.5: Impact of introducing severity weighting




• Larger equivalence classes by denition contain more severe crimes. This alone discloses
some information
• The distribution of reported crimes has a signicant impact on how serious the problem
above can become. Figure 5.6 gives a breakdown of the largest category (85-95) from
Figure 5.5(b). For this subset of anonymised data under CG-kanon we see that the more
severe crimes have a higher frequency with Murder being as high a 31%. This is the
equivalent of a 3-diverse dataset and provides inadequate inferential privacy protection
given the severity of such a crime. Figure 4.2(c) showed that Murder had the highest
frequency for a single oence in our generated data. This contributed to the problem
seen in these larger equivalence classes under CG-kanon. If for instance the frequency of
Murder was lower this would have resulted in more diversity.
Figure 5.6: Shortcoming of CG-kanon
We note that whilst the combination of k-anonymity with a severity penalty seems quite
straightforward we should recall that this is done whilst minimising information loss and apply-
ing the desired weightings for the QIDs. The implementation of this is therefore rather more
complex and served as a valuable stepping stone to develop the more robust CG-diverse GA to
which we now turn our attention.
5.2.1.2 CG-diverse
As discussed in Chapter 4, CG-diverse is based on the notion of l-diversity. Our results show
that this stronger notion of privacy can be implemented by a GA and that the shortcomings
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of CG-kanon can be addressed by CG-diverse. Our results here are based on the A1:S1:R1
weighting however results for other weightings are similar. The average severity level obtained
for the data used in our experimentation was 11. As noted, however, in Chapter 4 the second
phase of the algorithm reduces this global diversity requirement and considers the average
severity of each equivalence class before suppressing the QIDs. The lowest such diversity level
within an equivalence class was 3 in our results.
(a) CG-kanon
(b) CG-diverse
Figure 5.7: Sensitive attributes frequency for CG-kanon and CG-diverse using A1:S1:R1
We comment on the following points when looking at Figure 5.7:
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• Higher diversity (lower frequency). Average diversity for CG-kanon varies between
10% and 30%. CG-diverse is much lower at 9% to 14% and therefore inferential risk is
also lower
• Correlation with crime severity. The desired lower frequency (i.e. higher diversity)
for more severe crimes is evident in CG-diverse whereas in CG-anon there is no such
correlation. More severe crimes (Rape and Murder) in this case actually have lower
average diversity
• Variation of diversity. We see the deviation from the mean frequency for more severe
crimes is lower as severity increases. So not only does the average diversity increase as
crime severity increases but the variance decreases as well. This gives us more certainty
that more severe crimes will be less vulnerable to inference attacks
• l-diversity implies k-anonymity. We mentioned before that l-diversity guarantees at
least k-anonymity where k is equal to l. The lowest diversity of 3 mentioned earlier for our
dataset using CG-diverse may appear quite weak from a privacy perspective when looking
at the global diversity of 11. However, it is rstly much more unlikely that severe crimes
will be included in such lower diversity equivalence classes in CG-diverse. Secondly, we
are still better o that in CG-kanon. Our results there showed that even for severe crimes
such asMurder the largest equivalence classes still only achieved 3-diversity in some cases.
5.2.2 Optimising for utility
5.2.2.1 Information loss
The losses assigned to generalised attributes within a tuple were set out in Section 4.4. Fig-
ure 5.8(a) and Figure 5.8(b) show the aggregated information losses for dierent weighting
schemes after termination of the algorithm.
We selected the three weighting schemes to monitor how the algorithms perform when at-
tributes with varying granularity are weighted dierently. For instance the A10:S5:R1 scheme
overweights the Age attribute which is highly granular and underweights the Reporter attribute
with only 3 leaves - A1:S5:R10 tests the opposite scenario. A1:S1:R1 however is equivalent to
having no weighting scheme.
We make the following observations about the losses and weighting schemes:
• We see the weighting scheme achieves the desired loss proles. Where Reporter is pri-
oritised for anonymisation (A10:S5:R1) we see more information loss for that attribute
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(a) CG-kanon (b) CG-diverse
Figure 5.8: Loss metrics for CG-kanon and CG-diverse
- the converse is true for A1:S5:R10. Where no weighting is assigned variation of losses
decreases
• Total information loss for CG-diverse is slightly higher than CG-kanon. This is expected
due to the stronger privacy guarantees of CG-diverse
• Total loss for A1:S5:R10 is lowest for both algorithms. The tendency for the algorithm
to suppress the more granular Age attribute under this weighting causes this
• The attribute weighting for CG-diverse is still eective, however, less so than for CG-
kanon. For instance, we observe a lower variation between the maximum and minimum
loss for A10:S5:R1 and A1:S5:R10 in CG-diverse compared to CG-kanon. The restriction
on diversity is prioritised and thereby the weighting is less signicant during optimisation
Appendix C shows sample anonymised data from CG-kanon and CG-diverse where crime re-
ports with the same report IDs were selected. The output conrms the impact of the attribute
weighting scheme as measured by the loss metric above. By inspecting the sample output from
CG-kanon we see the following for example:
• A10:S5:R1. There are 6 tuples where age is left unchanged whilst the reporter type
attribute has 24 tuples that were generalised to the highest level ("Reporter")
• A1:S5:R10. There are 36 tuples where age was generalised to the highest level ("18_87")
whereas the reporter type attribute now only had 3 tuples generalised to the highest level
("Reporter")
Our sample output from CG-diverse as shown has similar characteristics. However the dif-





The Weka framework was used to perform classications on dierent anonymised datasets. The
anonymised datasets were generated by applying dierent anonymisation algorithms to the
same sample of crime reports (sample size of 1000 records). The results from a 10-fold cross-
validation using a Naive Bayes inducer are shown in Figure 5.9. We performed classications
on both anonymised datasets and their corresponding regenerated counterparts (i.e. we took
the anonymised data and randomly generated non-anonymised data from this).
5.2.3.1 Classication
Figure 5.9: Classication accuracy for dierent anonymisations
We see from Figure 5.9 that all classications have very low accuracies. This was alluded to in
Section 4.1.1 where we pointed out that crime categories were randomly assigned to tuples. We
should therefore not expect much classication accuracy. The validity of using classication
accuracy as an indicator for the utility of an anonymisation is case specic. Where the raw
data has low classication accuracy one should not look for high accuracies in the anonymised
data.
The relative higher classication accuracy of CG-kanon is a symptom of the shortcoming men-
tioned earlier. More severe crimes are located in larger equivalence classes. This clustering
induced by the severity penalty in CG-kanon improves classication accuracy. It is interesting
to note the lower accuracy for the corresponding regenerated dataset. This arms our dis-
cussion earlier in Section 2.4 which indicates that where classication is conducted it should
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be done on the regenerated (non-anonymised) data to avoid spuriously induced classication
accuracy.
One observation we might make is that prioritising the anonymisation of the more granular Age
attribute (A1:S5:R10) results in slightly higher classication accuracy than when the Reporter
attribute is prioritised for generalisation (A10:S5:R1). This would support the notion in [7]
where better classication accuracy was achieved by prioritising the numerical age attribute.
5.2.3.2 Kullman-Leibler divergence
A script in Python was written to calculate the Kullman-Leibler(KL) divergence for various
algorithms. Figure 5.10 indicates the variation in the KL-value if various proportions of the
original (non-anonymised) data are suppressed. This also served to validate our script.
Figure 5.10: KL-divergence at various suppression levels
Where we have highly granular attributes one should expect anonymised data based on gener-
alisation to have fairly high KL-values. This is evident from our results in Figure 5.11.
Analogous to our results for information loss, the KL-divergence for CG-diverse is slightly
higher for all weightings compared to CG-kanon due to the higher privacy guarantee. The
benet of using KL-values is, however, that it provides a standard means for comparing dif-
ferent anonymisation algorithms or anonymisations with dierent loss metrics. The statistical
interpretation of the KL-divergence as covered in Section 2.4 also provides a rmer foundation
for this metric.
The impact of the weighting scheme on the KL-value is lastly worth commenting on. In contrast
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Figure 5.11: KL-divergence for dierent anonymisations
to the classication accuracy a lower KL-value is obtained when more granular attributes are
generalised to a lesser extent. More granularity is retained in the data for A10:S5:R1 compared
to A1:S5:R10. On this basis we would prefer A10:S5:R1 if looking at KL-divergence. This is
the opposite conclusion reached when looking at classication accuracy.
The marginal increases in information loss and KL-values for CG-diverse relative to CG-kanon
seem quite acceptable given the improved privacy provided by the former. For our results the
information loss across the three weighting schemes was on average 7% higher and the KL-value
only 1.4% higher for CG-diverse compared to CG-kanon. This reduced data utility is acceptable
given our desire for better privacy within the MCRF.
5.2.3.3 Computational and time constraints
Computing power and time constraints dictated much of our implementation. Section 5.1
already highlighted some relevant issues.
The hardware platform for our implementation was an entry-level dedicated server hosted
remotely by a third party. In practice the law enforcement agency may prefer a local server to
restrict physical access to it. The specications and hardware utilised for our implementation
were therefore not excessive and should be easily obtainable and implementable.
Operating within the time constraints was however more challenging. The open-ended nature
of GAs required us to dene a time limit per anonymisation to make the implementation prac-
tical. Figure5.12 shows the reduction for information loss retrieved from the optimisation logs.
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The marginal benet from optimisation decreases exponentially over time. It was our initial
judgement that 30 minutes allowed the algorithm sucient time to improve the anonymisation
whilst not letting the third party user wait indenitely for a result. However when looking at
Figure 5.12(a) and 5.12(b) we see that we could halve this time and still benet adequately
from the optimisation of the GA. Alternatively we might increase the sample size and keep the
runtime of the algorithm at 30 minutes.
(a) CG-kanon (b) CG-diverse
Figure 5.12: Information loss reduction versus time
One further insight we wish to point out relates to the number parameters which the GA opti-
mises within the tness function. We see that information loss for CG-diverse on termination is
a much lower proportion of its starting value than for CG-kanon. This can be attributed to CG-
kanon having more parameters in the tness function than CG-diverse. CG-kanon searches for
solutions that minimise information loss and the severity penalty whilst satisfying k-anonymity.
CG-diverse only minimises information loss whilst meeting the diversity requirement. This one
additional parameter for CG-kanon increases the search space and reduces the eciency of
the algorithm. For instance at termination the reduction in the initial information loss for
A10:S5:R1 in CG-diverse was 74% compared to 55% for CG-kanon.
We lastly observe that the optimisation for information loss is much "smoother" for CG-diverse.
This is again due to the simpler tness function. The sudden peaks and troughs for CG-kanon
occur as the algorithm introduces variation to improve optimisation. Figure 5.13 shows the
severity penalty as well as the information loss optimisation for CG-kanon. A sudden increase
in information loss often coincides with a drop in the severity penalty and vice versa. This
additional dimension reduces optimisation eciency and we see from this that whilst multi-
objective EAs are suited to solving multi-dimensional problems there is a denite benet when
a simpler tness function can be specied. This improved eciency was evident for CG-diverse
which has a simpler tness function.
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Figure 5.13: Optimisation parameters vs time
5.3 Discussion
We summarise our ndings in this section and provide additional insights which may not be
evident from our evaluation above.
A qualitative assessment of the distributions of the anonymised data show that CG-diverse is
the preferred implementation. Whilst CG-kanon seeks to limit linking attacks it introduces un-
acceptably high inferential risk for more severe crimes in larger equivalence classes. Information
loss is incrementally higher for CG-diverse but this is acceptable given the additional privacy
guarantees against inferential attacks. We pointed out earlier that smaller equivalence classes
were created for CG-kanon in an attempt to reduce inference attacks. Another possible ap-
proach which may be used is to consider all attributes as sensitive attributes as done by [7]. In
this manner the reported crime attribute may also be suppressed which reduces distributional
information relating to the reported crime.
When looking at the low classication accuracies and high KL-divergence values we reiterate
that using suboptimal data (i.e. crimes were assigned randomly to tuples) prevents one from
generating results designed to suit a specic utility metric. This was selected as a design
feature of our experiments and therefore the somewhat unfavourable values of both utility
metrics should not be seen as an interpretation of the success of CG itself. Values for the
metrics produced intuitive metrics consistent with the rest of our results.
We specically selected Java as the programming language to allow for threading during the
optimisation process. This enables multiple processors to concurrently perform the optimisation
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which can signicantly reduce the runtime. The Opt4J framework was also selected with this
in mind and provides documentation on how this may be implemented. Although we did not
implement a multi-threaded CG optimisation we note that this may be considered in future to
improve the runtime of the algorithm.
We summarise our results by observing that whilst the the shortage of human capital in our
resource constrained setting was addressed by the GA combined with our crime severity scale,





Our work has introduced the concept of a crime severity scale and shown how this might be
applied to achieve automation for the anonymisation of data within the mobile crime reporting
framework (MCRF) introduced by Burke and Kayem [7]. In particular we proposed a severity
penalty to be used when anonymising data based on k-anonymity to reduce successful linking
attacks; we also proposed an average severity measure used for an l-diverse approach to limit
inference attacks.
We introduced an attribute weighting scheme that provides more exibility for third party
users in specifying the granularity of dierent quasi-identiers (QIDs) in the anonymised data.
This is achieved by modifying the original general loss metric introduced by [24]. We use a
a genetic algorithm (GA) implementation to minimise information loss whilst achieving the
required levels of privacy.
Our GA known as "CrimeGenes" (CG) is implemented based on both a k-anonymous model
(CG-kanon) and an l-diverse model (CG-diverse). The GAs of both implementations integrate
the entire anonymisation into a single process which achieves optimality with respect to infor-
mation loss, the weighting of QIDs specied by the third party user and privacy constraints
(k-anonymity or l-diversity informed by the crime severity scale). This is one of the main
advantages of a GA approach - achieving optimal k-anonymity and l-diversity with respect to
information utility whilst incorporating the exibility to weight attributes dierently. A local
recoding of the anonymised data is also performed in our GA approach, although this can be
done using more conventional algorithms as well. The main disadvantage of our GA approach
compared to other anonymisation techniques is arguably the computational cost involved and
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therefore the time it takes to generate the output. Most other conventional anonymisation al-
gorithms (such as Datay) are much faster but then lack the optimality and exibility obtained
by using a GA approach.
The computational complexity of the GA mentioned above required us to take a sampling
approach to make our implementation practical given time constraints. However, to ensure
privacy constraints are also met whilst making most recent crime reports accessible to third
party users, we proposed a random sampling approach without replacement. A normal sampling
approach which allows for replacement can increase disclosure risk. Crime reports released to
a given third party in a previous data request are therefore excluded from being selected in
subsequent releases. A sampling approach also reduced computational complexity and therefore
runtime for our GA.
Our discussion above alludes to the fact that a crime severity scale in combination with a
GA automates the anonymisation process and produces optimal results for a given runtime.
This addresses the lack of expertise normally faced within a law enforcement agency in a
developing country to anonymise data appropriately. Our sampling approach in releasing the
anonymised data ensures our GA remains practical and can provide output to third parties
within a reasonable time period. The computational and time constraints of our resource
constrained environment are thereby also satised.
6.2 Avenues for future work
Our main focus for future work may relate to expanding on the notion of biases in the MCRF.
We introduced possible means of capturing and compensating for such biases through an ad-
justment factor using our GA. Our preliminary work in this regard could be expanded to
investigate the specic form of the adjustment factor further. Other existing techniques not
employing a GA could also be modied to compensate for biases as part of the anonymisation
process. Yet another approach might be to apply GAs as a pre-processing step on the raw data,
not to perform anonymisation, but to identify possible biases and remove such records from
the dataset. For instance, a GA might be used to identify multiple crime reports all reporting
the same incident.
A focus area for continuous further improvement of our current CG implementation is the
runtime of our algorithm. This is an issue relevant to GAs in general. Possible approaches
which may be explored to decrease the runtime include:
• Employing a Michigan-based approach for the GA could be considered as discussed in
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Section 2.5.3 and benchmarked against CG which uses the Pittsburgh approach
• Other optimisation techniques, such as particle swarm optimisation (PSO), which share
similarities with evolutionary algorithms (EAs) may also be experimented with to see
whether runtime can be improved. PSO is dierent in that it does not use the optimisation
operators of cross-over and mutation common to most GAs
• The current version of CG could be developed further to make use of multiple processors.
As noted in our results the current Opt4J (covered in Section 5.1.2.1) allows for threading
although this complexity was beyond the current scope of our work
A last area of improvement relates to our sampling scheme. A more elegant approach may
be investigated which allows either sampling with replacement or proper sequential releases as





UML for CG-kanon anonymisation engine
Figure A.1: UML for CG-kanon
Please note that the UML diagram for CG-diverse is exactly the same except that the tness




Denition B.0.1 (χ2 cumulative distribution function). The cumulative distribution function
(CDF) for Z v χ2n is dened as:














• Γ(a) is the Gamma function
• γ(a, b) is the lower incomplete Gamma function
Denition B.0.2 (The adjustment factor). Since each crime category will be evaluated se-













b) equation B.1 can now be rewritten to dene the adjustment factor for
category c as:



































• This integral looks similar to the density function for a standard normal random vari-
able and might lead us to consider employing the cumulative distribution function for
a standard normal distribution to achieve a result. Indeed such a relationship exists
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(B.4)
Since the standard normal CDF is widely used in practice ecient numerical techniques exist
to evaluate this equation. This reformulation therefore enables us to quickly evaluate the
adjustment factor for a specic crime category. However, as indicated in the main body of
our work this formulation of the adjustment factor did not provide satisfactory results when




Table C.1: CG-kanon sample anonymised data
A10:S5:R1 A1:S1:R1 A1:S5:R10 CRIME
48_52 Southern Suburbs Witness 48_52 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness Assault
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim Forgery or Fraud
31 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Assault
43_47 Atlantic Seaboard Reporter 43_47 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Vandalism
48_52 City Bowl Reporter 18_87 Walmer Estate (District Six) Reporter 18_87 City Bowl Victim Domestic Violence
38_42 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Proxy 18_87 Northern Suburbs Proxy Disorderly conduct
28_32 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim Assault
28_32 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Northern Suburbs Witness Forgery or Fraud
18_22 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim Rape
18_22 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Durbanville Witness 18_87 Northern Suburbs Witness Other
23_27 Cape Town Witness 23_27 Southern Suburbs Reporter 23_27 Cape Town Witness Disorderly conduct
30 Cape Town Reporter 28_32 Atlantic Seaboard Reporter 28_32 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Illegal gambling
25 City Bowl Victim 18_87 City Bowl Victim 23_27 City Bowl Victim Other
23_27 Cape Town Reporter 26 Cape Town Reporter 23_27 City Bowl Victim Illegal gambling
58_62 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Proxy Murder
43_47 City Bowl Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Cape Town Witness Murder
18_22 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Kreupelbosch Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness Robbery
28_32 Cape Town Witness 18_87 City Bowl Reporter 18_87 City Bowl Witness Domestic Violence
45 Cape Town Reporter 43_47 Cape Town Witness 43_47 Cape Town Witness Burglary
23_27 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Proxy 18_87 Cape Town Proxy Arson
18_87 City Bowl Witness 18_87 City Bowl Witness 18_87 Lower Vrede (District Six) Reporter Drunken Driving
23_27 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim Murder
18_87 Cape Town Victim 23_27 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim Vandalism
18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 78_82 Cape Town Witness Domestic Violence
18_22 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Domestic Violence
23_27 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim Forgery or Fraud
38_42 Northern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim Forgery or Fraud
23_27 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Bantry Bay Reporter 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Victim Forgery or Fraud
43_47 Northern Suburbs Proxy 18_87 Northern Suburbs Proxy 43_47 Cape Town Proxy Domestic Violence
23_27 Cape Town Proxy 23_27 Cape Town Proxy 18_87 Southern Suburbs Proxy Assault
33_37 City Bowl Witness 18_87 City Bowl Witness 18_87 Cape Town Witness Assault
23_27 Cape Town Reporter 23_27 Northern Suburbs Reporter 23_27 Northern Suburbs Reporter Vandalism
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim Domestic Violence
33_37 Atlantic Seaboard Reporter 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Drunken Driving
58_62 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim Rape
18_87 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness Forgery or Fraud
58_62 Cape Town Reporter 58_62 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Edgemead Victim Drunken Driving
18_87 Southern Suburbs Reporter 38_42 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness Illegal gambling
18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Victim Illegal gambling
38_42 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim Drug related
22 Cape Town Victim 18_22 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim Drunken Driving
23_27 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim Arson
58_62 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Northern Suburbs Reporter 58_62 Cape Town Witness Vandalism
23_27 Cape Town Victim 23_27 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim Corruption
18_22 Cape Town Proxy 18_22 Cape Town Proxy 18_87 City Bowl Proxy Drunken Driving
66 Southern Suburbs Reporter 63_67 Southern Suburbs Reporter 63_67 Cape Town Reporter Illegal gambling
100
Table C.2: CG-diverse sample anonymised data
A10:S5:R1 A1:S1:R1 A1:S5:R10 CRIME
48_52 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness 18_87 Cape Town Reporter Assault
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Victim 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Victim Forgery or Fraud
28_32 Cape Town Witness 28_32 Atlantic Seaboard Reporter 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Assault
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Reporter Vandalism
48_52 City Bowl Reporter 18_87 City Bowl Victim 18_87 City Bowl Victim Domestic Violence
38_42 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Reporter 38_42 Northern Suburbs Reporter Disorderly conduct
18_87 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 28_32 Cape Town Reporter Assault
28_32 Northern Suburbs Witness 18_87 Northern Suburbs Witness 28_32 Northern Suburbs Witness Forgery or Fraud
18_22 Atlantic Seaboard Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter Rape
18_22 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_22 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Northern Suburbs Witness Other
23_27 Cape Town Witness 23_27 Southern Suburbs Witness 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness Disorderly conduct
30 Cape Town Reporter 28_32 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Illegal gambling
23_27 Cape Town Victim 18_87 City Bowl Victim 18_87 City Bowl Victim Other
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 23_27 Cape Town Reporter 23_27 Cape Town Victim Illegal gambling
58_62 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Proxy Murder
43_47 City Bowl Witness 18_87 City Bowl Witness 18_87 Cape Town Reporter Murder
18_22 Southern Suburbs Witness 18_22 Southern Suburbs Witness 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness Robbery
28_32 City Bowl Witness 18_87 Oranjezicht Reporter 28_32 City Bowl Witness Domestic Violence
43_47 Northern Suburbs Witness 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Goodwood Witness Burglary
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 23_27 City Bowl Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter Arson
73_77 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 City Bowl Witness 18_87 City Bowl Witness Drunken Driving
23_27 Southern Suburbs Reporter 23_27 Southern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim Murder
18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter Vandalism
18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Domestic Violence
18_22 Atlantic Seaboard Reporter 18_22 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Domestic Violence
23_27 Southern Suburbs Reporter 23_27 Southern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Cape Town Reporter Forgery or Fraud
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim Forgery or Fraud
23_27 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Atlantic Seaboard Victim Forgery or Fraud
43_47 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Proxy Domestic Violence
23_27 Southern Suburbs Reporter 23_27 Cape Town Reporter 23_27 Southern Suburbs Proxy Assault
33_37 City Bowl Witness 33_37 Cape Town Witness 33_37 Cape Town Witness Assault
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Proxy Vandalism
18_87 Northern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim Domestic Violence
33_37 Cape Town Reporter 33_37 Cape Town Witness 33_37 Atlantic Seaboard Witness Drunken Driving
58_62 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim Rape
38_42 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness Forgery or Fraud
58_62 Northern Suburbs Reporter 58_62 Northern Suburbs Victim 58_62 Northern Suburbs Victim Drunken Driving
38_42 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Witness Illegal gambling
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Claremont Victim Illegal gambling
38_42 Southern Suburbs Reporter 18_87 Southern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Cape Town Reporter Drug related
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Cape Town Victim Drunken Driving
23_27 Cape Town Victim 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim 18_87 Northern Suburbs Victim Arson
58_62 Northern Suburbs Reporter 58_62 Cape Town Reporter 18_87 Northern Suburbs Witness Vandalism
23_27 Southern Suburbs Reporter 23_27 Southern Suburbs Reporter 23_27 Cape Town Victim Corruption
18_22 City Bowl Reporter 18_22 Cape Town Proxy 18_87 Cape Town Reporter Drunken Driving
18_87 Cape Town Reporter 63_67 Cape Town Witness 18_87 Cape Town Witness Illegal gambling
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